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INCENTIVIZING DIVORCE 
Andrea B. Carroll* 
Incentives are a powerful thing. They suggest acceptable social 
and moral conduct, guide our behavior, shape our decision-making 
process, and often even spur us to action. In the legal sphere, an 
incentive is a favored tool of the lawmaker, one that he might use in a 
normative fashion to bring about a certain course of conduct.1 And 
even when society fails to act on the incentives created by its laws, the 
incentives serve a valuable expressive purpose. They convey the 
lawmakers ' desired message and provide aid in shaping societal views 
of certain legal institutions. 2 
Perhaps nowhere in the law is this hortatory, expressive bent more 
apparent than in the family law domain.3 Often, there is no real legal 
remedy available for the breach of obligations set out in laws regulating 
the family.4 And even when family law rules are enforceable, the 
possibility of compulsion is often less significant than the normative 
component of the rule.5 Law is used as a symbolic tool in family law.6 
In the area of child support, for instance, the image of the "deadbeat 
dad" and the legal consequences associated with such a status are 
instructive. 7 Certainly, the law provides a whole host of avenues for the 
collection of child support, including the garnishment of wages, a 
* C.E. Laborde, Jr. Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert 
Law Center. I thank the faculty of the University of Mississippi School of Law for the 
opportunity to present and receive valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this piece. I am also 
grateful to Katherine Spaht and Dian Tooley-Knoblett, who provided insightful commentary, as 
well as the LSU Law Center for its generous research support. Brandee Ketchum (LSU Law 
Center Class of2008) provided excellent research assistance. 
I Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996) 
(describing law as a "norm manager"). 
2 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 
VA. L. REV. 190 l (2000). 
3 Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 
1004. 
4 Scott, supra note 2, at 1929. 
5 Id. at 1929. 
6 Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the Law 
Support Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 225, 237 (2004) (discouraging 
harmful social marital institutions is a necessary component of a "marriage law that actively 
reflects and communicates shared norms about marriage"). 
7 Sean E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value of the Law in Shaping Social Perspectives 
on Marriage, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 23, 29 (2001). 
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relaxation of the typical rules of civil procedure to aid a party in 
collecting arrearages, and suspension of professional and other licenses 
of the obligor for nonpayment.8 But our lawgivers conjure the image of 
the deadbeat dad to send a message.9 The vast majority of child support 
in arrearages, for which a party may need to use the enforcement 
mechanisms detailed above, will never be collected.10 The avenues for 
collection exist, not solely for the purpose of aiding the collection of 
child support, but also to bring society to see the moral obligation of the 
debtor spouse to pay that support.11 The legal rules of child support 
serve an important purpose, regardless of whether they are ever 
enforced. 12 
In this norm-shaping sense, the rules of family law are expected to 
bear a rather hefty burden. Here more than in other legal arenas, law 
must send a strong message.13 Society has an interest in seeing its rules 
punish reprehensible familial conduct and encourage responsible and 
beneficial behavior.14 In the context of the spousal relationship, 
specifically, divorce is likely to be among the conduct most strongly 
discouraged by the lawmaker. That this would be so is not surprising 
when one considers the societal cost of divorce. It has been estimated 
that a single divorce costs the public roughly $30,000 and that the 
annual cost of divorce to the American taxpayers approaches $30 
billion. is On the other hand, the economic and other benefits of 
marriage both on the spouses themselves, and on society at large, have 
been well-documented for many years.16 
It is somewhat surprising, then, to find that the rules governing 
married parties' conduct toward each other provide a number of rather 
strong incentives to spouses to terminate their marital relationship at the 
earliest moment possible. Legal rules that either favor or disadvantage 
married persons are not difficult to find. They exist across all areas of 
8 See generally Jonathan S. Jemison, Collecting and Enforcing Child Support Orders 1ri1'1 
the Internal Revenue Service: An Analysis of a Novel Idea, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 137. 138 
(1999) (describing various state and federal schemes to enforce child support obligations). 
9 Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 29. 
10 Adam Clymer, Child-Support Collection Net Usually Fails. N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1997. at 
Al6. 
11 Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 29. 
12 Id. 
!3 Weisbrod, supra note 3, at 994 ("[W]e look at law because it can and ought to be used to 
teach specific things."). 
14 See generally Jane C. Murphy , Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children. The 
New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111 ( 1999). 
15 Rutgers University, The National Marriage Project, The State of' Our Unions. p. 22 (July 
2007). This cost estimate is "based on such things as the higher use of food stamps and public 
housing as well as increased bankruptcies and juvenile delinquency." Id. 
16 Id. (noting that married couples "create more economic assets on average" because of a 
"wealth-generation bonus" and that both divorce and unmarried childbearing "increase child 
poverty"). 
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law. 11 Indeed, the United States Government Accountability Office 
recently identified more than one thousand legal rules which provided 
for either penalties or subsidies to married persons in the federal 
government arena alone. 1s Rules which do not serve to benefit married 
persons, but instead incentivize divorce might be justifiable, or at the 
very least understandable, when they come about because of a necessary 
conflict in two vastly different areas of law. Thus, where the rules 
regarding illegal immigration and family law collide, it is easy to 
understand that one rule may have the unfortunate, and wholly 
unintended, effect of incentivizing divorce.19 Even within the sphere of 
family regulation, however, legal scholars have recognized perverse 
divorce incentives. One scholar has noted that the American Law 
Institute ' s  Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, in choosing to 
focus solely on financial aspects of the marital relationship and in the 
meantime ignoring the spouses' emotional ties, "endorse divorce."20 
Even more egregious is the notion that a number of rules of marital 
property, that area in which one might expect the law to be most 
protective of marriage, actually leave spouses better off divorced. This 
article focuses on precisely those pushes toward divorce, highlighting 
three of the most disturbing divorce incentives provided by rules of 
marital property. 
Part I will explore the incentives one spouse living under a 
community property regime has to seek divorce in order to better her 
position vis-a-vis creditors of the other spouse. A rule of marital 
property that allows creditors to seize more of the spouses' property 
after divorce than was permissible during the marriage pushes spouses 
toward divorce. Part II focuses on the failure of most states' laws to 
provide a spouse with a much-needed unilateral method of terminating 
the marital property regime, yet remaining married. Part III examines a 
17 A great number of provisions of law not detailed here provide spouses with rather 
substantial incentives to divorce. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage 
and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 9 (1990) ("Although divorce typically imposes formidable 
psychological and economic costs, there are few legal incentives to remain married, or even to 
consider thoughtfully the decision to end the marriage."). See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, 
Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 396 
(sunset provisions in matrimonial agreements); Douglas W. Allen, The Effect on Divorce of 
Legislated Net-Wealth Transfers, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 580 (2007) (child support guidelines); 
David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United States Law of Citizenship by Descent, 47 
ARIZ. L. REV. 313 (2005) (narrow citizenship rule); Marion Crain, "Where Have All the Cowboys 
Gone?" Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1877 (1999) 
(shift toward equal sharing in breadwinning responsibilities). 
!8 SHOSHANA GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 76 (Shoshana 
Grossbard-Shechtrnan ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
19 See generally lssacson, supra note I 7. 
20 Katherine Baird Slibaugh, Money as Emotion in the Distribution of Wealth at Divorce, in 
RECONCETVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW !NSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 243 (Robin Wilson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
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rule, not precisely of marital property, but rather of preemption of state 
marital property rules. Specifically, Congressional legislation 
governing retirement plans, at least as that legislation has been 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, provides a rather strong 
divorce incentive in that it precludes the application of state marital 
property rules allowing a nonparticipant spouse with an interest in a 
community pension to make a testamentary transfer of her interest upon 
death.21 After exploring each of these divorce incentives in detail, Part 
IV offers some observations as to why marital property rules that 
incentivize divorce are so disturbing. 
Many existing marital property rules simply send the wrong 
message about both marriage and the spouses' marital property 
regime.22 And even if no empirical evidence can be mustered to 
demonstrate that these incentives actually cause divorce,23 a shift in 
thinking is desperately needed in this area. If the substantive marital 
property rules that incentivize divorce are not reversed entirely, then, at 
a minimum, lawmakers and legal scholars must begin an exploration of 
whether the consequences of each of these three marital property rules 
justify their costs. Quite simply, these marital property rules do more 
harm than good. They make divorce a more attractive option for 
married couples than continuing their marriage. And worse yet, they 
send an inept and unrepresentative message about the value of the 
marital relationship. 
I. THE NARROWING OF CREDITOR ACCESS TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
AFTER DIVORCE 
Marital property rules, particularly those of community property 
regimes,24 sometimes provide couples a powerful incentive to divorce to 
21 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)( l ) (2006); Boggs v. B oggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997). 
22 The strong benefits of marriage to both society as a whole and the individual parties to it 
would lead one to believe that lawmakers would strive to "strengthen the foundation of marriage 
as a social institution by encouraging commitment to its success." Brotherson & Teichert. supra 
note 7, at 50. 
23 Of course, there is no empirical evidence which demonstrates that these rules of marital 
property cause spouses who otherwise would have remained married to act otherwise. 
24 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington have 
long been community property states. J. Mark Weiss, Community Property Interests in Separate 
Property Businesses in Washington, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 207 (2004) (citing Nathan R. Long. 
Community Characterization of the Increased Value of Separately Owned Businesses, 32 IDAHO 
L. REV. 731, 75�-61, 765 (1996)); see also Angela M. Bradstreet, Marital Property La11· in 
�;gland and Califor�ia: A .
Comparative Study and Critique, 4 HASTINGS !NT�L & COMP. L. REV. 3, 
_143 (1�80). W1sconsm became the last Amencan state to adopt a manta! property regime that �s considered "community" with its enactment of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act­heavdy 
_
based on the Uniform Marital Property Act-in 1986. See Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital 
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improve their position relative to creditors. Specifically, a nondebtor 
spouse will have substantially more protection from the creditors of the 
debtor spouse if the marriage is terminated than he would have if the 
marriage remains intact. This bizarre incentive to divorce results from 
the existence of marital property rules in some jurisdictions that insulate 
the nondebtor spouse's property-only after divorce-for debts 
incurred by the other spouse. 
The basic principle of the community property regime as it relates 
to debt collection is that all, or virtually all, of the community property 
of married persons is available for creditors of either spouse to seize in 
order to satisfy a debt incurred by either spouse during marriage. 25 
There are certainly exceptions. Some states limit the seizeable 
community property to that within the management and control of the 
debtor spouse. 26 And some states allow seizure of the entirety of the 
community property only if the debt at issue is one incurred for the 
benefit of the community.27 Further, some states insulate certain limited 
pieces of nondebtor property, such as the nondebtor spouse's earnings.28 
Still, it can hardly be disputed that the community property regime is 
exceptionally creditor friendly.29 It makes far more property available 
to creditors for seizure than does the separate property regime.30 
Typically, the community property regime's creditor bent carries 
forward even beyond divorce and continues to give creditors pervasive 
Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 769, 769-71 (1990). 
25 See, e.g., LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 2007) 
(entirety of the community property may be seized for a debt incurred by either spouse during 
marriage in Louisiana and California). Both states allow even premarital creditors of a spouse to 
seize the entirety of the spouses' community property, though California generally immunizes the 
earnings of the nondebtor spouse for premarital debts. LA C1v. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2007); 
CAL. FAM. CODE§§ 910(a), 911 (West 2007). 
26 These states include Idaho, Nevada, and Texas. See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA 
A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 426 (6th ed. 2004); Elizabeth De 
Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community 
Property law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 274 (1995). Idaho case law is unclear. Its courts have 
adopted a managerial approach since the early twentieth century, but have inexplicably, and 
perhaps even unintentionally, applied a community debt theory in a few recent cases. See Erik 
Paul Smith, Comment, The Uncertainty of Community Property for the Tortious liabilities of 
One of the Spouses: Where the law is Uncertain, There is No law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 799, 817-
23 (1994). 
27 Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin have adopted the community debt 
system. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 444; De Armond, supra note 26, at 275; 
McDonald v. Senn, 204 P.2d 990, 998 (N.M. 1949). 
28 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 911 (West 2007) (insulating nondebtor spouse's wages from 
seizure for the prenuptial debt of the other spouse as long as the wages are segregated from other 
community property). 
29 See, e.g., Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community 
Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. I (2007). 
30 Id. at 4. 
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seizure rights. 31 
However, at least two community property states-California and 
Idaho-deviate from the general community rule on creditor collection 
after termination of the marriage in a rather disturbing way.32 These 
rules are anomalous, and problematic, because they allow dissolution of 
the marriage to narrow the scope of assets available for creditor seizure 
from the entirety of the community property during the existence of the 
marriage33 to merely the portion of the community property awarded to 
the debtor spouse after dissolution.34 The reduction of property 
available to creditors for seizure post-dissolution essentially creates an 
incentive for spouses to divorce for the protection of the nondebtor 
spouse's assets. 
The California and Idaho rules have different sources-one 
statutory35 and the other jurisprudential36-and the rationale for 
31 This rule is statutory in two states. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2357 (2007); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 766.55(2)(c)(2)(2m) (West 2007). In five other community property states, the rule is 
jurisprudential. Community Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ariz. App. Div. I 
1995); Marine Midland Bank v. Monroe, 756 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Nev. 1988); Moucka v. 
Windham, 483 F.2d 914, 916-917 (10th Cir. 1973); Stewart Title Co. v. Huddleston. 598 S.W.2d 
321, 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Watters v. Doud, 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981); see also 
Mont E. Tanner, Twin Falls Bank & Trust v. Holley: Restricting Creditors' Rights under a 
Property Settlement Agreement--A Departure that Sets Ohio Apart, 26 IDAHO L .  REV. 595, 600 
(1990); Lamont C. Loo, Contractual Creditor Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Re1·isiti11g 
Twin Falls Bank & Trust v. Holley, Proposal: A Tripartite Analvsis, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 777. 782 
(1994). 
The rationale behind the post-termination collection rule in most states is essentially that 
property which could have been seized as community property during marriage should maintain 
that same status after divorce. See Loo, supra, at 788. In most cases, this policy has an equitable 
justification. When a creditor contracts with a married person, he forms expectations based upon 
the asset base of the entire community. To allow a spouse to frustrate those creditor expectations 
by divorce would be inequitable to the creditor. No such equitable argument based on creditor 
expectations exists in jurisdictions that allow seizure of the spouses' community property for the 
premarital debt of one of the spouses, however. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 43-46. 
32 While California and Idaho are the only two states that allow virtually no seizure of former 
community property in the bands of the nondebtor spouse after divorce, other states restrict post­
termination collection from the nondebtor spouse. For example, in Washington and Wisconsin. 
while a creditor can seize former community property in the hands of either spouse, that access 
does not extend to any equity in the asset that has accrued after termination of the marriage. 
Watters v. Doud 631 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 766.55(2)(c)(2)(2m) (West 
2007) ("Marital property assigned to each spouse under [the dissolution] decree is available for 
the satisfaction of such an obligation to the extent of the value of the marital property at the date 
of the decree."). Furthermore, in Louisiana, a spouse may, by written act, assume responsibility 
for one-half of each community obligation incurred by the other spouse. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 
2357 (2007). Such an assumption allows the assuming spouse to dispose of former community 
property without incurring further liability for obligations incurred by the other spouse. id. 
33 Loo, supra note 31, at 780 (divorce does not affect a creditor's right to seize property post­
termination, but merely the quantity of the property accessible to the creditor). 
34 CAL. FAM. CODE§ 751 (West 2007) ("The respective interests of the husband and wife in 
community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal 
interests."); IDAHO CODE § 32-7I2(1)(a) (West 2007) (providing for a "substantially equal 
division in value" unless there are "compelling reasons" to otherwise allocate property). 
35 CAL. FAM. CODE§ 916(a)(2) (West 2007). 
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narrowing the scope of creditor seizure powers after dissolution is 
slightly different in each state. At least one important common thread 
does exist, however. Neither state considered, at the time its rule was 
enacted or even since, what effect the rule might have in the way of 
incentivizing divorce. And neither state has taken any step to reduce the 
divorce incentives caused by the rules, or even to study the matter in 
sufficient depth to come to the conclusion that the rules are well­
justified despite the divorce incentives they provide. 
A. California's Rule 
Family Code section 916, which became effective on January 1, 
1985,37 is the source of the rule limiting post-dissolution creditor 
collection efforts in California. That section provides: 
The separate property owned by a married person at the time of the 
division and the property received by the person in the division is not 
liable for a debt incurred by the person's spouse before or during 
marriage, and the person is not personally liable for the debt, unless 
the debt was assigned for payment by the person in the division of 
the property. Nothing in this paragraph affects the liability of 
property for the satisfaction of a lien on the property.38 
The rule is a significant one because it is distinct from the 
California rule of creditor access to the community property of spouses 
in an intact marriage. 39 Creditors seeking satisfaction of debts incurred 
"before or during marriage" may freely seize the California spouses' 
community property, regardless of which spouse incurred the debt and 
regardless of the rights of the spouses to manage the property subject to 
seizure.40 Perhaps even more importantly, section 916 represents a 
36 Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. Holley, 723 P.2d 893 (1986). 
37 When the rule described here became effective in 1985 , it was California Civil Code 
section 5120.160. It was moved to the Family Code in 1994, thought the change was not 
substantive. Law Revision Commission Comments, CAL. FAM. CODE§ 916 (West 2007). 
38 CA. FAM. CODE § 916(a)(2) (West 2007). The community property that passes to the 
fonner spouse is not immunized when a lien has been placed on the former community property. 
Id. Even a lien from a judicial mortgage caused merely by recordation of a judgment before a 
division of property has occurred would subject the nondebtor spouse to the rights of the creditor 
under the lien. WILLIAM BASSETT, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW § 9:48 (West 
2007). See also Lezine v. Sec. Pac. Fin, 925 P.2d 1002, 1006-!007 (Cal. 1996). 
39 Compare CAL. FAM. CODE§ 916(a)(2) (West 2007) with CAL. FAM. CODE§ 910(a) (West 
2007). See also B A SSETT, supra note 38 ("Thus, the principles of liability of community property 
during marriage are not applicable after division of the property upon dissolution."). 
4° CAL. FAM. CODE§ 910(a) (West 2007). This statute expressly defines "during marriage" 
to exclude periods of physical separation that precede a legal separation or judgment of divorce. 
Id. at§ 910(b); see also BASSETT, supra note 38 ("'during marriage' lasts until separation, not 
final judgment"); S. Brett Sutton & Lee A. Miller, Civil Code Section 5120. I IO(c): California 's 
New Approach to Postseparation Obligations, 23 PAC. L. J. 107 (1991) (describing the precursor 
section to California Family Code article 910(b)). But see supra note 112 (restriction on creditor 
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change from prior California j urisprudence,41 which had rather 
uniformly held that the entirety of the former community property may 
be seized by creditors even after divorce.42 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had 
occasion to interpret the provisions of section 916 in a bankruptcy case 
rather quickly after its passage. In the case of In re Chenich, Mr. and 
Mrs. Chenich were physically separated, but not yet divorced, when Mr. 
Chenich was involved in a car accident.4 3 Shortly after Mr. and Mrs. 
Chenich's divorce became final, the victim of the accident received a 
judgment against Mr. Chenich in the amount of $1. 7 m illion.44 A 
number of Mr. Chenich's post-divorce assets were seized in satisfaction 
of the debt, but those assets were not sufficient to fully satisfy the 
judgment, and Mr. Chenich filed a personal bankruptcy petition one 
year after he and Mrs. Chenich divorced.4 5 Mr. Chenich died before the 
debt was fully satisfied.46 The trustee in bankruptcy then sued Mrs. 
Chenich, arguing that she was required to relinquish the property she 
received in the community property settlement, either because it was 
seizable for Mr. Chenich's debt or because it was transferred to her 
fraudulently.47 Thus, the court was required to confront the scope of the 
access for prenuptial debts). 
41 BASSETT, supra note 38; see also Law Revision Commission Comments, CAL FAM. COOi: 
§ 916 (West 2007). 
42 Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Mantz, 49 P.2d 279 (1935) (judgment 
creditor could seize former community property in the hands of a nondebtor spouse); see also 
Head v. Crawford, 202 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 984); Gould v. Fuller, 5 7  Cal. Rptr. 2.1 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Greene v. Wilson, 25 Cal. Rptr. 630, 633 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 962); Harley 
v. Whitmore, 51 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Lezine v. Security Pacific Fin. 
Serv., Inc., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d I 16, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. I 995), affd, 925 P.2d 1002 (Cal. 1996); M.I'. 
Allen General Contractors, Inc. v. Kervin, 2002 WL 265060 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Liahi/i11 
of Marital Property for Debts, 17 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports l, 22 (1984). 
. 
43 87 B.R. 101, 1 03 (BAP 9th Cir. 1988). 
44 Id. See also In re Braendle, 46 Cal. App. 4th I 03 7 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1996). In Braendle. 
the husband was awarded community stock at the dissolution of marriage and was ordered to pay 
his former wife an equalizing payment, which the court ruled was to be secured by the stock. JJ 
at 1040. Husband was also allocated a $58,000 debt to American Overseas (the husband's 
airfreight company, the stock of which he was allocated at partition). Id. The issue presented in 
the case was whether the former wife or American Overseas, both creditors of husband, had �' 
priority interest in the stock. Id. at 1041. The court noted that the broad rule of creditor acces� tn 
community property is modified when the parties divorce and California Family Code § l) I (1 
becomes applicable. Id. at 1042 (quoting the California Law Revision Commission's comments 
on intent of the provision (see infra, note 59)). Because the debt here was not assigned to the· 
wife, the court held that § 916 prevents the seizure of her former community property for ih 
satisfaction. Id. American Overseas could seize the stock in husband-debtor's hands, but wik 
had priority as a secured creditor. Id. at 1 045. 
45 In re Chenich, 87 B.R. at 103. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. Under the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee could avoid the' 
transfer of property by Mr. Chenich if the transfer could have been avoided under California la\1. 
Id. at 104. 
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liability of a nondebtor spouse's former community property.48 
The court noted that California law changed radically in 1985 to 
insulate the property a nondebtor spouse receives in divorce.49 The 
change from full accessibility of former community property under the 
pre-1985 law was necessary, according to the court, because of serious 
tracing and valuation problems that existed under the old law.50 Thus, 
relying on section 916, the court found the former community property 
Mrs. Chenich received in divorce free from seizure for the debts Mr. 
Chenich incurred during their marriage.51 
California has given rather broad application to the policies 
effectuated by section 916. In addition to In re Chenich, the statute has 
been applied in a number of cases since its passage to restrict creditor 
access to both the nondebtor spouse's former community and separate 
property.52 And California courts have even held that the statute applies 
to restrict a creditor's collection efforts if the debt at issue was incurred 
before the section's 1985 effective date, so long as a collection attempt 
was made after it came into effect. 53 
The rule carries such an obvious and negative suggestion to 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See, infra, text accompanying notes 54-60. 
51 In re Chenich, 87 B.R. at 104. 
52 See, e.g., M.P. Allen General Contractors, Inc. v. Kervin, 2002 WL 265060, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2002); Stewart v. Edmunds, 2002 WL 192911, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). See generally 
Gagan v. Gouyd, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), disapproved of on other grounds by 
Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 169 (Cal. 2003); In re Marriage of Braendle, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Lezine v. Security Pacific Fin. Serv., Inc., 925 P.2d 1002 (Cal. 1996). 
53 CAL. FAM. CODE § 930 (West 2007) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, this part 
governs the liability of separate property and property in the community estate and the personal 
liability of a married person for a debt enforced on or after January I ,  1985, regardless of whether 
the debt was incurred before, on, or after that date."); see also American Olean Tile Co. v. 
Schultze, 169 Cal. App. 3d 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (wife's former community property not 
seizable for satisfaction of business-related promissory note signed by husband while spouses 
were separated at the time the note was signed and husband was allocated the business upon 
divorce). In American Olean Tile, the husband executed a promissory note the month before the 
spouses' marital property settlement was incorporated into a judgment of divorce. Id. at 362. 
The court dispensed with the fact that California Civil Code sections 5120.160 and 5120.320 
(now California Family Code sections 916 and 930) were meant to apply only after divorce by 
holding that under California Civil Code section 5118 (now California Family Code section 771 ), 
both the husband's income and obligations incurred in the operation of a separate property 
business were not community assets or liabilities. Id. at 364. Under the California jurisprudence, 
the execution of the marital settlement agreement, which was executed before the promissory 
note, transmuted the community property business into the separate property of the husband. Id. 
Furthermore, once the transmutation occurred, any creditor seeking to enforce a business debt 
incurred thereafter was restricted to enforcement from the separate property of the debtor spouse, 
provided that the agreement was not entered into to defraud the creditor and the creditor was not 
misled as to the nature of any assets that the creditor relies upon. Id. The court upheld the 
retroactivity of sections 5120.160 and 5120.320 (now California Family Code sections 916 and 
930, respectively), given that equitable distribution of marital property is a significant state 
interest. Id. at 367. 
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spouses about how to best avoid their creditors that 1t 1s somewhat 
surprising that the California legislative history does not reveal a single 
discussion of the perverse incentives it creates. The California 
legislature, in studying its pre- 1 985 rule of full community property 
liability after divorce, viewed the scheme as one rife with both 
pragmatic and theoretical problems. 54 Practically, the rule was a 
difficult one because of the tracing issues it necessarily raised. 
Questions arose, for instance, as to whether increases in the value of 
former community property should be seizable, and whether liability 
should follow former community property if it changed in form after 
termination.55 Theoretically, the California legislature was troubled by 
the notion that a nondebtor could be held liable for another' s  debt after 
divorce, when the very purpose of allocation of debts upon divorce is to 
designate a particular person from whom the creditor can satisfy his 
claim-typically, his debtor. 56 After much consideration, the legislature 
determined that, after a marriage has terminated, it is typically "unwise 
to continue the liability of spouses for community debts incurred by 
former spouses." 57 Thus, the rule was changed to hold only the former 
community property in the hands of the spouse who is allocated the debt 
in a community property partition to be seizable by creditors. 58 The 
legislature's intent was that "in allocating the debts to the parties, the 
court in the dissolution proceeding should take into account the rights of 
creditors so there will be available sufficient property to satisfy the debt 
by the person to whom the debt is assigned, provided the net division is 
equal."59 The section effectively does exactly what the California 
legislature intended; it  immunizes "the nondebtor spouse from liability 
as to former community property awarded to him . . .  on dissolution." 60 
B. Idaho 's Rule 
Idaho's rule is far less clear than California's, largely because the 
rule is not statutory. Rather, the Idaho post-dissolution seizure rule is 
one that comes from the state' s  jurisprudence, which, on this point, is 
tortured at best. 
The first Idaho case to set out the rule that creditor collection 
attempts are limited to the debtor spouse's interest in the former 
community property after divorce was Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co. v. 
54 See Comm'n Reports, supra note 42, at 23. 
55 Id 
56 Id 
57 Dawes v. Rich. 60 Ca l. App. 4th 24 , 30 (C a l. Ct. App. l 997). 
58 Ci\L.FAM.CODE§916(West2007). 
'9 s· C 
' R - C'l' omm n eports, supra note 42, at 23 - 24. 
60 B!\SSFTT, supm note 38. 
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Holley.61 In that case, Mr. Holley signed a $125,000 promissory note 
for a loan related to his construction business while he was physically 
separated, but not yet divorced, from his wife.62 The note became due 
after the spouses were officially divorced, but rather than requiring Mr. 
Holley to pay the note when it became due, the creditor, Twin Falls 
Bank & Trust, executed an extension agreement with Mr. Holley which 
gave him almost an additional two months to pay.63 Mr. Holley failed 
to repay the loan when the extended due date passed and thereafter filed 
for bankruptcy.64 After collection efforts against him proved fruitless, 
Twin Falls sued Mrs. Holley, seeking to seize her former community 
property to satisfy the outstanding balance on the note.65 Mrs. Holley 
argued that Twin Falls was required to limit itself to the property held 
by Mr. Holley for satisfaction of a debt it contracted solely with him.66 
Before turning to the resolution of Twin Falls' claim against Mrs. 
Holley, the Idaho Supreme Court first articulated the general rules that 
apply in Idaho when creditors try to collect from a spouse living under a 
community property regime. The court noted that creditors contract 
with members of the marital community individually, because the 
community itself is not a legal entity.67 Therefore, the property 
available to creditors for seizure depends largely upon whether they 
contract with one or both of the spouses. 68 If the creditor contracts with 
only one of the spouses, only that spouse's separate property is seizable 
for the debt; the nondebtor spouse's separate property remains free from 
liability.69 However, the entirety of the community property is available 
for seizure regardless of whether one or both spouses contracts the 
debt.70 In essence, then, "the community property system merely makes 
61 7 23 P. 2d 893 (1986). 
62 Id. at 895. 
63 Id. at 895. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 896 ("The marital community is not a legal entity such as a business partnership or 
corporation. "). 
68 Id. Whether a creditor contracts with one spouse or both spouses jointly affects only the 
availability of separate property of either spouse to satisfy the debt, since a creditor's seizure of 
community property is not dependent upon both spouses incurring the debt. See supra text 
accompanying notes 25-30. 
69 This rule is statutory in origin. Idaho Code§ 32-912 (2 008) provides: 
Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the 
community property , and either may bind the community property by contract . . .  and 
any community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the spouse 
who did not so consent. . . . 
But see Loo, supra note 31, at 783, 785-86 (criticizing "community obligation " language of the 
statute as erroneously suggesting that Idaho is a community debt rather than a managerial system 
state). 
70 Holley, 7 23 P.2d at 895-96. 
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additional resources [beyond what would be available to a creditor in a 
separate property jurisdiction] (community property) available to a 
creditor from which to seek satisfaction of an unpaid debt."7 1  
The court viewed the creditor' s position in this case as  altered, 
however, when Mr. and Mrs. Holley divorced. The precise language of 
the opinion here is important, as it seems to expand upon prior Idaho 
jurisprudence in a way that has significant implications for the rules of 
creditor collection in Idaho. In articulating a rule of creditor access to 
property after divorce, the court stated: 
Absent allegations of . . .  contractual liability, a creditor may not, 
with one exception, proceed against community assets distributed to 
[a nondebtor spouse] pursuant to a divorce decree. The sole 
exception to this rule was set forth in our case of Spoka.ne 
Merchants ' Ass 'n v. Olmstead. 72 In that case, we held that where, 
pursuant to divorce proceedings, one member of the marital 
community is responsible for a community obligation but is not 
awarded sufficient community assets to satisfy such a debt, a creditor 
may properly seek satisfaction for the debt from community property 
distributed to the other spouse. Essentially, the holding of Spoka.ne 
Merchants ' Ass 'n v. Olmstead, supra, is  that members of the marital 
community may not utilize divorce proceedings to perpetrate a fraud 
on creditors of the community.73 
Finding no evidence of a fraudulent transfer or insufficiency of 
assets at the time of the transfer, the court dismissed Twin Falls '  suit 
against Mrs. Holley. 74 
The Holley court 's  basic articulation of the result in a prior Idaho 
7 1 Id. at 896. 
72 327 P.2d 385 ( 1 958). 
73 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897. The court's language is interesting, as it implies that a divorce 
settlement transferring insufficient assets to a debtor spouse is necessarily one that perpetrates a 
"fraud" on creditors. Asset insufficiency and fraud are certainly di stinct concepts, and the 
language appears somewhat erroneous. However, in the fraudulent transfer context, these 
concepts are often intermingled. It is typically asset insufficiency that amounts to the only 
outward proof that a "fraud" occurred. See Amanda Barkey, Note, The Application of 
Con:;tructive Fraud to Divorce Property Settlements: What 's Fraud Got to do With it?, 52 
WAYNE L. REY. 22 1 ,  226 (2006) (describing the development of "constructive fraud" in marital 
property transfers). Given the difficulty of proving the presence of actual fraud upon a creditor, 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act incorporates constructive fraud, which exists when: I) a 
transfer was made by the debtor; 2 )  for less than reasonably equivalent value; and 3) the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of transfer, or was made insolvent by the transfer. Id. 
Although not mentioned in Spokane Merchants ' Ass 'n, its rule does not apply to 
community realty subj ect to an encumbrance. Under Idaho Code section 32-9 1 2, both spouses 
must sign and acknowledge an instrument of encumbrance in order to properly encumber 
community realty. IDAHO CODE § 32-9 1 2  (West 2007); see also Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 779 
P.2d 22. 25 (Ct. App. Idaho 1 989). 
74 Holley, 723 P.2d at 898. The court did not reach the issue of the whether the "extension 
agreement" the husband entered into after divorce bound the wife because the bank did not offer 
any evidence indicating that husband was awarded insufficient assets from which to satisfy the 
_judgment. Id. at 896. 
2009] INCENTIVIZING DIVOR CE 1937 
case, Spokane Merchants ' Ass 'n, 75 is correct. The Spokane Merchants ' 
court did allow a creditor to reach the former community property of a 
nondebtor wife-specifically, land conveyed to her in a divorce 
settlement-after the marriage terminated in divorce. 76 But the context 
in which the creditor's right to seize that property was granted is 
important. The court in Spokane Merchants ' noted that the question 
there was whether property awarded to a nondebtor spouse after a 
divorce and settlement agreement is "subject to the payment of 
community debts incurred prior to such settlement and decree."77 In 
finding that the creditor could seize the land wife held by virtue of the 
divorce decree, the Spokane Merchants ' court relied heavily on the fact 
that the assets the debtor-husband took in divorce were insufficient to 
pay the community debts and cited Idaho's version of the fraudulent 
transfer laws.78 Specifically, the court noted that transfers, including 
those between husband and wife, cannot be effective under Idaho law if 
they are perfected "with intent to delay or defraud any creditor."79 The 
Holley court was correct, then, in noting that Spokane Merchants ' 
prevents spouses from divorcing "to perpetrate a fraud on creditors of 
the community."80 
The problem is that Holley sets out a "general rule" of post­
termination creditor collection that Spokane Merchants ' does not. 
Spokane Merchants ' does not clearly detail a general rule preventing 
creditors from seizing the former community property of the nondebtor 
spouse. The court there simply held that a divorce and attendant 
settlement agreement does not place the property awarded to the 
nondebtor out of the hands of the creditor in cases of fraudulent transfer, 
or debtor retention of assets amounting to a zero value.8 1  In other 
75 327 P.2d 385 (Idaho 1 958). 
76 Id. at 389. 
77 Id. at 388. 
78 Id. 
79 Spokane Merchants ', 327 P.2d at 388. Under IDAHO CODE § 55-906 (West 2007) (voiding 
any transfer of property with intent to delay or defraud any creditor), the burden of proof rests on 
the party alleging the fraud. See generally Kester v. Adams, 85 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1936). But see 
Chester B. Brown Co. v. Goff, 403 P.2d 855 (1965) (although the burden of establishing fraud is 
on the party alleging the fraud, it shifts to those seeking to uphold the transaction when numerous 
badges of fraud exist). 
80 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897. 
81 Id. ; see also Tanner, supra note 31, at 595-96 (unclear in Spokane Merchants ' whether 
facts evidencing a fraudulent conveyance were a "necessary prerequisite for the creditor to pursue 
the former community property" in the hands of the nondebtor spouse). 
As authority for the proposition that a transfer between spouses can be voided if it defrauds 
creditors, the Spokane Merchants ' court relied on Bank of Orofino v. Wellman, 143 P. 1169 
(1914). In Bank of Orofino, creditors of Mr. Wellman attached and levied a judgment upon the 
separate property house and land of Mrs. Wellman (in which the spouses lived). Id. at 1169. 
Mrs. Wellman argued that the attachment was a cloud on her title; her husband argued that 
improvements made to the property out of community funds were also her separate property, as 
the improvements were a gift to his wife. Id. at 117 1 .  The court found that the transfer was not 
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words, Spokane Merchants ' could be read to retain the creditor' s  right 
to seize the entirety of the former community property for the 
unsatisfied debt of one spouse in all cases, with an even stronger 
rationale for doing so in cases involving fraudulent transfers or 
insufficient retention of assets by the debtor. 82 A number of community 
property states '  rules provide for just such a solution. 83 
The interesting l anguage in Holley, then, is that portion of the 
opinion in which the court states that "[a]bsent allegations of . . .  
contractual liability, a creditor may not, with one exception, proceed 
against community assets distributed to [a nondebtor spouse] pursuant 
to a divorce decree. "84 This is the central language of the Holley 
opinion. It is the language that is important to the resolution of the 
controversy between Twin Falls Bank and Mrs. Holley, since the facts 
of that case apparently did not raise the issue of insufficiency of assets 
or fraudulent transfer. And this general principle that a creditor' s  post­
divorce access to former community property is limited to that in the 
hands of the debtor spouse absent special circumstances is what 
subsequent commentators seem to agree that the Holley decision stands 
for.85 
What is surprising about the court 's  resolution of this question is 
that the rule the court sets out has no prior basis in Idaho law. The court 
cites no authority for the rule it applies, save the possible exception of 
Spokane Merchants '. But earlier Idaho cases, including Spokane 
Merchants ', simply don ' t  set out a rule of creditor access to the 
nondebtor's portion of the former community property absent 
allegations of fraudulent transfer or transferor asset insufficiency.86 To 
resolve the dispute presented in the Holley case, it may have been 
necessary for the court to issue a legal ruling on a matter of first 
impression-the scope of creditor access to former community property 
absent an alleged fraudulent transfer. What is disturbing, however, i s  
that the court fails to expressly, or even impliedly, recognize what a 
significant step the creation of this rule amounts to, particularly since it 
intended to defraud the Bank, since at the time the gift was made, the husband did not have any 
indebtedness to existing creditors. Id. Thus, husband's  creditors had no right to seize wife's 
separate property in satisfaction of husband's debt. Id. at 1 172. Bank of Orofino stands for the 
proposition that a creditor cannot reach the separate property of the nondebtor spouse absent a 
fraudulent transfer. It does little to resolve the question as to whether former community property 
in the hands of the nondebtor spouse can be seized absent a fraudulent transfer. 
82 Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 604 (arguing that Twin Falls failed to properly distinguish 
Spokane M<!rchants · as an insolvency case, and therefore erroneously relied on it as authority). 
SJ See supra text accompanying notes 26-3 1 ;  see also Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 60 I .  
84 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897. 
85 One commentator, for instance, remarked that "the court has disregarded the general rule in 
other community property states and has articulated new precedent in Idaho." Tanner, supra note 
3 L at 608. 
86 Spokan<! Merchants ', 327 P.2d 385; see also Bank of Orofino, 1 43 P. 1 1 69. 
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deviates from the rule applied in a number of other community property 
jurisdictions. 87 
It is perhaps particularly disturbing that this important, and 
anomalous, Idaho rule of reduced creditor access after divorce is set out 
against the peculiar Holley backdrop.88 It seems to be another 
application of the now axiomatic view among lawyers that "bad facts 
make bad law."89 The Holley court sets out a rule limiting access to 
former community property for all creditors of Idaho spouses in the 
context of a case brought by a creditor which had a number of 
opportunities to collect from and perfect a security interest in the 
debtor's property and failed to do so.90 Moreover, the creditor in Holley 
extended the debtor's repayment date, and even signed a new note with 
him to represent the new agreement after the marital relationship had 
terminated,91 raising questions of whether the extension makes it 
appropriate to even consider the nondebtor spouse's liability at all.92 I n  
short, there are plenty o f  reasons a court might have denied Twin Falls 
recovery against Ms. Holley, not the least of which was Twin Falls' 
inaction and neglect. That the Holley case has created the Idaho 
precedent reducing all creditors' access to former community property 
post-dissolution, even where those creditors are diligent, is troubling. 
The novel factual context in which the Holley rule was espoused should 
mitigate any scholarly reticence to revisit the rule-either legislatively 
or jurisprudentially.93 
C. A Rule Worth Its Negative Message? 
Even setting aside the strange Holley background, scholars have 
debated the propriety of rules, such as those set out in California and 
Idaho, which limit creditor access to former community property upon 
87 See supra notes 26-3 1 and accompanying text. 
88 In Holley, the Bank had ample opportunity to satisfy its debt from the assets of Mr. Holley; 
however, the Bank chose to renegotiate with Mr. Holley, based solely on his post-termination 
status and assets. Holley, 723 P.2d at 893, 897. When the Bank lost its interest in his separate 
property to Mr. Holley's bankruptcy trustee, it waited another two years before attempting to 
collect the debt from Ms. Holley. Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 608. 
89 See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 ( 1 992) (Thomas, J.,  dissenting); In re 
Sole, 233 B.R. 347, 349 (E.D. Va. 1998); Abcon Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 678, 
690 (200 1 ). 
90 Holley, 723 P.2d at 897. 
91 Id. at 895. 
92 Id. 
93 Even though the Holley decision has been a part of the Idaho jurisprudence for more than 
twenty years, there should not be a problem with long reliance on it. Perhaps because the court's 
meaning is viewed as unclear and its opinion has been so heavily debated, few subsequent courts 
have relied on it;, and most for minor propositions not germane to the issue at hand here. See, 
e.g., Tanner, supra note 3 1 ;  Loo, supra note 3 1 .  
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divorce.94 Some have argued that divorce should not effect a reduction 
of the property available to creditors, as they are not parties to the 
action.95 Due Process and other constitutional concerns are implicated 
when divorce prejudices non-party creditors. 96 Some further argue that 
the necessity of a divorce judgment that is definitive and finally settles 
claims must trump a creditor' s ability to continue pursuing the former 
community property of a nondebtor spouse, perhaps even years after 
judgment of divorce is rendered, unless that spouse was allocated the 
debt in the judgment of divorce. Absent some cutoff of liability, the 
allocation of debts by the divorce court is virtually meaningless.97 
On the other hand, narrow rules of post-termination creditor access 
such as those applied in California and Idaho are occasionally lauded as 
j ust for the nondebtor spouse, typically with an admonition that "the 
purposes of community property law are not solely to improve a 
creditor's position, but are intended rather to provide a fair and balanced 
interest in the protection of creditors and of the nondebtor spouse. "98 
Subjecting a nondebtor to the perpetual fear of seizure for a debt she did 
94 See, e.g. , Tanner, supra note 3 1 ;  Loo, supra note 3 1 ;  REP PY & SAM1JEL, supra note 26, at 
447. 
95 Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 600 (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859 ( 1 960)); see also 
Cmty. Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1 009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 995); Donnell v. Donnell, 
567 So. 2d 1 143 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Broadway Drug Store of Galveston, Inc. v. Trowbridge, 
435 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1 968). 
96 See Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 604 ( 1 990) (noting that creditors' rights advocates may find 
the rule "overburdensome and [] an unconstitutional restraint on creditors' rights"). But see 
Arneson v. Arneson, 227 P.2d 1 0 1 6, 1 0 1 7  (Wash. 1 95 1 )  ("[T]here is no due process of law in a 
divorce action as to the rights of creditors of the spouses. The judgment can neither conclusivey 
[sic] determine their rights, nor be made available on their behalf as a basis for any of the 
provisional remedies."). 
In In re Chenich, 87 B . R. 1 0 1 ,  106 (BAP 9th Cir. 1 988), the bankruptcy trustee argued that 
California's enactment of what is now section 9 1 6  retroactively abolished his right to enforce a 
valid debt and that the abolition was a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
The court found that the trustee failed to meet his burden to show that the legislature acted 
arbitrarily. Id. According to the court, the legislature had not acted arbitrarily in creating a quick 
transition period away from a collection scheme it found "unsound."  Id. at 1 06 ("A generalized 
statement that because creditors would be deprived of payment their due process rights are 
violated . . . is not good enough . . .  to carry the burden of proof that the legislature acted 
arbitrarily and irrationally . . . .  ") .  However, the Chenich court addressed itself only to the 
effective date of section 9 1 6  and whether it  could affect obligations not yet enforced, rather than 
to the constitutionality of the deprivation in general. 
Tanner notes that there can be no vested rights in community property for an unsecured 
creditor that fails to either get both spouses' signatures or obtain a judgment and a writ of 
attachment against specific property. Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 609. Without a right in a specific 
piece of property. it  seems unlikely that it can be a constitutional violation to deprive a creditor of 
the right to seize certain property by allocating it to the nondebtor spouse in  a divorce proceeding. 
See also 111 re Clte11ich, 87 B.R. at I 05 (noting that the California rule was passed with the due 
process rights of the nondebtor spouse, rather than those of the creditors, in  mind). 
97 Tanner, supra note 3 1 , at 60 I .  
98 Tanner. supra note 3 1 .  at 605; see also Loo, supra note 3 1 ,  at 797-98 (arguing the 
anomalous Idaho rule should be the law in all community property jurisdictions) .  
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not incur is difficult to consider just.99 
I have certainly argued elsewhere that the community property 
regime as it stands today is far too creditor-friendly, and on the merits, I 
tend to favor the California and Idaho rules as most equitable to the 
nondebtor spouse. 10° Creditors certainly do not need more protection 
from the marital property regime in the form of perpetual access to the 
entirety of the former community property. 1 01 The issue in this context, 
however, is really not whether the rule is a sound one on the merits; 
rather, courts and policy-makers should acknowledge that, regardless of 
whether they view post-dissolution creditor access limitations to be 
sound policy, the rules act as an incentive to divorce. This incentive 
should be explored. Its effects should be studied. Courts should be 
expressing concern about the rule. Safeguards to protect against the 
incentive should be explored. Yet no California or Idaho court or 
legislative body has done that. 
Policy-makers certainly should not overindulge in the worry that 
mass divorces will result from post-termination collection rules like 
those in California and Idaho. Divorce cannot act as an absolute shield 
from creditors and even the California and Idaho rules will not always 
insulate the former community property of the nondebtor spouse.  
Almost every state now has rules designed to prevent fraudulent 
transfers or conveyances, 1 02 and several states have interpreted these 
rules to extend to transfers incident to divorce. 103 Thus, if spouses 
engage in "actual fraud," meaning they divorce and enter into a property 
settlement agreement for the purpose of delaying or defrauding their 
creditors, the fraudulent transfer rules should allow the creditor to seize 
the former community property in the hands of the debtor spouse by 
99 "Subj ecting a former spouse to this continuous fear years after the marriage has been 
terminated raises the issue ofunconscionability." Tanner, supra note 3 1 ,  at 605-06. 
1 00 See generally Carroll, supra note 29. 
I O I  Id. 
102 Elaine A. Welle, ls it Time for Wyoming to Update Its Fraudulent Conveyance Laws?, 5 
WYO. L. REV. 207, 228 (2005) (noting that by 2005, over 42 states had enacted the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act). A listing of the states that have adopted UFTA, and the statutory 
provisions for those states, is available from the Legal Information Institute at Cornell University. 
See Legal Information Institute, Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator, http://www.law 
.cornell.edu/uniform/vol7.html#frtra (last visited Jan. 1 3 ,  2009). 
1 03 See Estes v. Titus, 73 1 N.W.2d 1 1 9 ,  1 27-128 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); Filip v. Bucurenciu, 
28 Cal. Rptr. 3d (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (fraudulent transfer statute extends to divorce property 
settlements in both California and Nevada); Dowell v. Dennis, 998 P.2d 206, 209 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 1999); Greeninger v. Cromwell, 9 1 5  P.2d 479, 482 (Or. Ct. App. 1 996); Kardynalski v. 
Fisher, 482 N.E.2d 1 1 7, 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 985); In re Hoyt, 97 B.R. 730 (Banl<r. D.Co1U1. 1 989) 
(Bankruptcy Code and Connecticut's  Fraudulent Transfer Law extend to transfers incident to 
divorce); In re Fordu, 201 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 1999) (bankruptcy court can avoid a transfer 
between spouses pursuant to a divorce decree). See generally Amanda Barkey, Note, The 
Application of Constructive Fraud to Divorce Property Settlements: What's Fraud Got to do With 
it?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 221 (2006). 
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disregarding the transfer altogether. 104 Fraudulent transfer rules a�so 
protect creditors against "constructive fraud" by the spouses,
_ 
which 
would require less subjective proof of malicious intent. Specifically, 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) recognizes as fraudulent 
any transfer, including one pursuant to a divorce settlement that is made 
"without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
transfer" if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or 
became insolvent as a result thereof. 1 05 Courts have been reluctant to 
recognize transfers made pursuant to divorce settlements as 
constructively fraudulent, however, for a number of reasons, most of 
which relate to complications that arise from the requirement o f  proving 
lack of "reasonably equivalent value." 106 A number of courts, at least in 
the bankruptcy context, have found issue preclusion an obstacle to a 
new court determining whether a transfer is fraudulent. The problem 
these courts have identified is that the central issue in a fraudulent 
transfer case-the equity of the transfer-is one on which a divorce 
court has already ruled. 1 o7 Other courts have held that a court reviewing 
a divorce settlement for purposes of determining whether it violates the 
UFTA can avoid facing issue preclusion by merely making a "surface 
determination" that the parties ' settlement was within the range that 
would have resulted from litigation. 10s In short, the application of the 
UFTA in the divorce context, at least where there is no clear proof of 
actual fraud, is murky. These rules cannot be relied upon to set aside a 
large number of transfers made pursuant to divorce settlements. 
Moreover, the couples we should truly worry about taking 
advantage of the creditor-restrictive post-termination rules in 
jurisdictions like California and Idaho are not those who desire to stay 
in a committed relationship but choose divorce for its advantages and 
are able to escape fraudulent transfer rules. Rather, it is the no-doubt 
more common situation of ambivalent spouses109 that best demonstrates 
the troubling nature of the incentives some post-termination creditor 
collection rules provide. For many of these fringe couples, divorce is 
1 04 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ( UFTA) § 4(a)( l )  (2005). See. e.g. , Mejia v. Reed, 74 
P.3d 1 66 (Cal. 2003) (recognizing that application of the UFT A to divorce settlements 
complicates them and undem1ines the finality of divorce judgments, but applying the Act nonetheless). 
105 Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) § 5(a) (2005). 106 In re Sorlucco, 68 B . R. 748, 753-754 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1 986) (noting that although it is clear that a transfer with mtent to defraud could be challenged, it is not so clear that a challenge would surv1.ve m a  case mvolving no actual intent). But see In re Fordu, 201 F.3d 693 ( 6th Cir. 1 999); In :e Stms
_
on, 364 B.R_. 278 (Bankr. W.D.Ky. 2007) (both cases casting doubt on Sorlucco insofar as It questions the ability of the court to set aside a constructive transfer). 107 Barkey, supra note 1 03 ,  at 23 1 -232. 
108 Id. at 234. 
lO� �ee Sherman, supra note 17,  at 396-97 (arguing that prenuptial agreements with sunset provts1ons can goad an "ambivalent spouse" into divorce proceedings) .  
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not a simple, black-and-white choice that is made overnight. It is, 
instead, an agonizing and lengthy process that involves the evaluation of 
a number of factors weighing both in favor of and against the decision. 
The relevant concern in this context is that the draw of the ability to 
escape liability from debts a spouse incurred (and for which community 
property could have been seized) either during or even before the 
marriage is almost irresistible. Divorce becomes an infinitely more 
attractive option with such a creditor collection rule. 1 10 The rule tips the 
scales in a way that a marital property rule should not. 1 1 1  
It may be tempting to reject divorce incentives as insignificant, at 
least absent evidence of a causal link between divorce and post­
termination creditor access rules. Community property jurisdictions 
have failed to ignore such incentives in other, similar contexts, however. 
Indeed, a number of community property jurisdictions created a rule 
allowing full seizure of the entirety of married spouses' community 
property for a premarital debt incurred by just one of the spouses, 
precisely because of the negative incentives the contrary rule would 
offer. 1 1 2 The equity of holding a spouse's share in community for the 
payment of the other's antenuptial debt, likely not connected in any 
conceivable way to the marriage, is difficult to support. But 
jurisdictions which have passed rules allowing liberal seizure of 
community property for premarital debts have done so because they felt 
it was the only way to stop the practice of "marital bankruptcy."1 1 3 
The unacceptable incentive at issue in the "marital bankruptcy" 
context was not that divorce could situate a spouse more favorably vis­
a-vis a creditor, but rather that marriage might. Early in the American 
experience with the community property regime, the notion of seizure 
of community property for the premarital debts of one of the spouses 
1 1  O See generally Gary R. Stenzel & Jeff Banks, Defunct Marriage: Its Possible Application in 
Idaho Divorce Law, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 725, 727-733 (1994) (arguing that Idaho's failure to 
provide rules for accumulation of property and debt during a period when spouses are still 
married but living separate and apart creates equitable problems that can be avoided by divorce). 
I I I Some would argue that marriages involving an ambivalent spouse are not worthy of legal 
focus and protection. 
[L]egal control of marriage has no call to deal with hypothetical fungible legal spouses 
seen in the flattering mirror of the ought-to-be. Its business is with people as they are. 
Its first premise should be that the weak, the overbearing, the nasty, the selfish-those 
who have failed of decent effort to make a marriage go--are least likely prospects to 
rear well because of mere compulsion to stay in unsatisfactory marriage. 
Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: II-The Decay of the Traditional Marriage­
Pattern, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 284 ( 1 933). See also Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of 
Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE L. J. 1435, 1 435 ( 1 998). A contrary view is set out, infra, Part IV. 
1 1 2 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2345 (2007); Action Collection Services v. Seele, 69 P.3d 1 73, 
1 78 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003); CAL. FAM. CODE § 91 0(a) (West 2004). 
1 1 3 This practice also became known as the $2 bankruptcy, a phrase signifying the debt­
insulation effect that could come merely from obtaining a $2 marriage license. See Carroll, supra 
note 29, at 8-9 (citing Hines v. Hines, 707 P.2d 969, 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 985); Schilling v. 
Embree, 575 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 977). 
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was virtually unheard of. l 14 That rule changed in some of the 
community property jurisdictions, and the reason it changed is that 
spouses could effectively contract marriage for the purpose of bettering 
their position with regard to creditors. 1 15 A person with hefty premarital 
debts could simply marry, and because the entirety of the spouses ' 
community property could not then be seized for debts incurred before 
marriage, his creditors would be largely frustrated.1 16 The marriage 
essentially afforded a cheap and simple avenue mirroring bankruptcy. 
The notion that escaping creditors might be an incentive to marry 
has been taken very seriously in community property law. Ironically, 
both California and Idaho have used the possibility of the marital 
bankruptcy as the rationale for allowing creditor access to community 
property for premarital debts. 1 17 The alternative-allowing creditor­
escaping behavior to provide an incentive to marry-was simply viewed 
as unpalatable. It is odd that some rules of creditor collection, namely 
those involving seizure for premarital debts, have been created in such 
an incentive-focused way-assuming that spouses act (i.e., choose to 
marry) in part based on those incentives-while others, namely post­
dissolution seizure rules that have exceptionally similar incentives, 
would be ignored in the divorce context. The incentives are similarly 
strong and similarly egregious. We must take the idea that spouses may 
divorce to gain insulation from creditors as seriously as we take the 
notion that they may marry to insulate themselves, and adequate steps 
should be taken to prevent not just the latter, but also the former 
occurrence. 
1 1 .  THE LACK OF A MECHANISM FOR UNILATERALLY TERMINATING A 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY REGIME 
Once the bond of the community property regime is established, 
most jurisdictions provide no means of escape absent divorce. The 
spouses wi l l  share as partners in the community property they have 
accumulated. Each has an ownership interest in the entirety of the 
1 1 4 WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
372 ( 2d ed. 1 97 1  ); sl'e also Carroll. supra note 29, at 8. 
1 1 5  See. £\� . Recent Developments, Co1111111111ity Property-Antenuptial Debts-Eliminating 
!111m11111tr of Eum111g.1· and Acrn11111/atio11s o( Dehtor Spouse-R. C. W. 26. 1 6.200 as Amended by 
Ch. 1 2 1 .  Lm1s of I Y69. !st Extraordinarr Session. 45 WASH. L. REV. 1 9 1 ,  1 92 ( 1 970)· see also 
Carrol l .  supra note 29. at 8 .  
' 
1 1 6 Carroll. supra note 2 9 .  at 8 .  
1 1 7  Sl'e Carol S. Bruch. Ma11age111rnt 
.
Po11·ers and Dlllies Under California 's Community 
Propern· Lml'.I : Rffom111e11datw11.1· .for Reform, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 227, 247-48 ( 1 982);  Carroll, 
supm note 29. at 9 .  
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community property. 1 1 8 And the spouses "share" in the management of 
community property as well; the essence of the basic management 
scheme in all of the American community property states is that each 
spouse, acting alone, may manage community property on behalf of 
both spouses.1 1 9 Moreover, except in the case of a few serious 
transactions, one spouse may act in a way that binds the entirety of the 
spouses'  community property, and not just the acting spouse' s  share. 120 
The existence of a community property regime, then, can lead to some 
rather serious disadvantages for a spouse who did not take steps to 
contractually avoid the regime before marriage and yet finds himself 
married to a spendthrift. 1 2 1 The spouses together may execute a 
1 1 8 Mark Patton, Quasi-Community Property in A rizona: Why Just at Divorce and Not Death?, 
47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 67, 1 68 (2005). 
1 1 9 See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 345-46. 
1 20 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-2 14(B) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § l I OO(a) (West 2007); IDAHO 
CODE § 32-9 1 2  (2007); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 40-3 - 14(A) (2007); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 1 23.230 (2007); w ASH. REV. CODE § 26. 1 6.030 (2007). Although most 
states operate under an equal management scheme, several states have categories of property that 
are exempted from that scheme in some form. For example, spouses are generally required to 
concur in the sale or encumbrance of immovables (or real property). ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-
2 1 4(C)(l )  (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1 l OO(c) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (2007); LA. 
C!V. CODE ANN. ART. 2347 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 40-3-13 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230(3) 
(2007). Also, a spouse that operates a business enterprise over which he has primary control is 
generally afforded sole and/or exclusive control over that enterprise. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1 IOO(d) 
(West 2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2350 (2007). 
l 2 1  Community property states generally allow spouses to assert claims for damages against 
each other for certain egregious acts of mismanagement, even if the complained-of activity is that 
which one spouse may undertake alone under an equal management scheme. The legal standard 
for recovering these damages is often rather onerous, however, as the rules are designed to avoid 
familial litigation and to relieve courts of the burden of examining every transaction made by both 
spouses over the course of a long marriage. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 407-08. In 
Louisiana, for instance, a spouse may only recover damages from the other for fraudulent or bad 
faith management of community property. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (2007). Management 
decisions which unintentionally harm a spouse's interest, and even those made from purely self­
interested motives without regard to the likelihood that the other spouse's interests will be 
prejudiced, are not sufficient to make the managing spouse liable in damages. See generally 
Aymond v. Aymond, 758 So. 2d 886, 890-9 1 (La. Ct. App. 2000). Similarly, Wisconsin merely 
requires a spouse to act in "good faith" in managing community property. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
766. 1 5  (West 2007). See Alexandria Streich, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership: 
Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 
367, 383 ( 1 998) (discussing the difference between acting in "bad faith" and not acting in "good 
faith"). Both of these states, then, would impose damages for few acts of mismanagement, at 
least as compared with states which impose a fiduciary duty on spouses. See, e.g., Mezey v. 
Fioramonti, 65 P.3d 980, 989 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (statutory rights to act with respect to 
community property remain subject to a fiduciary duty to the other spouse with respect to that 
property); Roselli v. Rio Cmtys. Serv. Station, Inc.,  787 P.2d 428, 433 (N.M. 1990) (spouses' 
management of community property subject to a fiduciary duty to the other spouse); Streich, 
supra, at 368 n.2 (calling for clarification of the fiduciary standard between spouses); Kelly 
Kromer Boudreaux, Comment, So You 've Married a Mismanager: The Inadequacy of Louisiana 
Civil Code Article 2354, 68 LA. L. REv. 2 1 9  (2007) (arguing for a stricter standard of 
management during marriage in Louisiana (as compared to California's fiduciary duty standard) 
that would make spouses more accountable for acts of mismanagement). Moreover, it is unlikely 
that a spouse in any community property state, regardless of the standard which must be met to 
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postnuptial agreement terminating their legal regime and establishing a 
regime of separation of property. 1 22 But such an agreement would 
require the consent of both spouses.12 3  If a mismanaging spouse d?es 
not desire a separation of property, divorce may seem the only option 
for the other spouse to protect his interest.124 
Theoretically, there is an alternative to divorce for a spouse in this 
situation, who desires to maintain the marital bond-a unilateral 
method of terminating the community property regime, yet remaining 
married. That remedy is the judgment of separation of property. If 
well-designed and well-applied, a judgment of separation of property 
might provide a useful alternative to divorce. Unfortunately, it is 
sanctioned by far too few of our American community property 
states. 12s Moreover, even in the states that do recognize a spouse's  right 
to obtain a j udicial separation of property, the remedy is not as simple 
and useful as it should be. 
A. The Origin of the Judgment of Separation of Property 
The j udgment of separation of property originated in Roman 
law, 126 even though the Romans did not have a marital property scheme 
akin to a community property regime. 1 27 Under ancient Roman law, the 
property a wife brought into marriage-her dowry-was managed by 
recover damages, will be able to recover significant damages from a spendthrift to protect her 
intcn.:sts. The same acts of m ismanagement which give rise to a claim for damages are likely  to 
result in the near-complete depletion of the mi smanag ing spouse's assets. The availabi l ity of a 
damages remedy . then, is ineffective in solving the problem of unilateral mismanagement that is 
inherent in an equal management scheme. 
1 22 Carro l l, supra note 29, at 27-28. 
l 2.l Moreover. courts will not al ways honor such agreements. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra 
note 2(1, at 33-35.  
l 2-I Some have proposed modification of the equal management scheme in community 
property jurisdictions to remedy these problems.  See generally Lisa R. Mahle, A Purse of Her 
01rn: The Case Against Joint Bunk Accounts. 16 TEX. J .  WOMEN & L. 45 (2006) . Other scholars 
have argued that ··the answer is not in legislation that would limit the rights of creditors or the 
rights of women and men in marriage to equal management and control ." 8ASSE1T, supra note 
38.  Makin!_! management rules more stringent and increasing judicial review of spousal activities 
may serve to increase spousal anxiety over managem ent issues. "If worries about judic i al second­
guessing strike before marriage becomes troubled. they may lead to separat ion of property; if 
after trouhlcs begin, they may expedi te divorce." W.T. Tete, A Critique of the Equal 
Mc111llg!'ll1<!11l Act o/ 1 '1 711. 39 LA. L. RFV. 4 91 .  5 44 ( 1 979) .  
125  L\.  Cl\'. CODE ANN. art. 2374(A) (2007 ); WIS. STAT. ANN.  § 766. 70 (West 2007). 
l 2h Dl< i .  24 . 3 .24 ( U lpian. Ad Edictum 33);  see also MARCEL PLANIOL. 3 TREATISE ON THE 
C1\· 1 1 LAW. No. 1 1 6 1  ( Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 1 938) ( 1 959); Walter Loewy, The 
.\i1t111ish Co1111111111in· of A n1uets and Gai11.1· and its Adoption and Modification by the State of 
Co/i/im1ill. I CAI.. L. REV. 32, 3 7-38 ( 1 9 1 2) (discussing the Spanish combination of the 
co111muni1y of acqucts and gains and the Roman dowry system). 
1 2 7  Wil l iam Wirt Howe. The Co1111111111itr llf Acquests and Gains. 12 YALE L.J. 2 1 6, 2 1 6  
( 190J ) 
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her husband. 12s A wife was simply incapable of administering her own 
property. 1 29 The wife maintained an interest in the eventual return of 
that dowry throughout the existence of the marriage, however, and if  
she reasonably feared that her husband's mismanagement put her right 
to the return of that dowry at risk, Roman law allowed her to seek 
restitution of the dowry even while the marriage continued. 130 
The basic idea behind that right to seek restitution of dowry for a 
husband' s  mismanagement was accepted by later societies operating 
under the community property regime, including both Spain and 
France, 1 3 1 and the idea has manifested itself in the form of a judgment 
of separation of property, at least since the late sixteenth century. 1 32 
French law provides the clearest example of the evolution and 
persistence of the judgment of separation of property. 1 33 
The notion that a spouse could unilaterally seek and obtain, with 
court approval, a separation of property during marriage was 
necessitated by the head and master scheme that persisted in France, 
and all other community property regimes, until the 1 980s. 1 34 In the 
community property context, it was a way for a wife, and a wife only, 1 35 
1 28 DIG. 23.3 .7.3 (Ulpian, Sabinus 3 1 ) ;  Ernst Levy, Reflections of the First "Reception " on 
Roman Law in Germanic States, 48 THE AM. HIST. REV. 20, 27 ( 1 942). 
1 29 Id. at 27. 
1 30 DIG. 24.3.24 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 33); see also PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 16 1 .  
1 3 1  Las Siete Partidas Part. IV, Tit. XI, Law XXIX; 1804 French C .  CIV. art. 2425; see also 
PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 6 1 ;  Loewy, supra note 126, at 34 ("[T]he influence of Roman 
Law may be found throughout the history of Spanish law"); Julie Hardwick, Seeking Separations: 
Gender, Marriages, and Household Economies in Early Modern France, 21 FRENCH HIST. 
STUD., 1 57, 1 5 8  ( 1 998) (detailing the 1 67 4  request of Marye Lechou for a separation of property 
from her husband because he wasted her dowry of200 livres). 
l 32 Hardwick, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 1 62 (noting a petition for separation of property filed in the 
Natais, France court between 1 598 and 1 6 10). Hardwick also notes that in the late sixteenth 
century, two petitions for separation of property were made by husbands, one because he had 
been "imprisoned" for his wife's debts. Id. 
1 33 The judgment was a possibility under French customary law for centuries before it was 
incorporated into the first French Code Civil. Hardwick, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 160 (describing the 
judgment of separation of property in Burgundian and Breton customary law). 
French law distinguished between a separation of property (separation de biens) and a 
physical separation (separations de corps et de biens). JULIE HARDWICK, THE PRACTICE OF 
PATRIARCHY, 1 1 1  (Pa. State Univ. Press 1998); see also RODERICK PHILLIPS, FAMILY 
BREAKDOWN IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE, 133 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980). When a 
French court granted a petitioning spouse a separation of property, that j udgment did not provide 
an authorization for the spouses to enter different households. The spouses were to remain 
together, with the wife gaining only the ability to administer her property. Hardwick, supra note 
1 3 1 ,  at 1 6 1 .  
Modem Spanish law also retains the concept of such a judgment for acts of "fraud, 
damage, or danger" to the community interest of the other spouse. See CODIGO CIVIL art. 1393, 
available at http://civil.udg.es/normacivil/estatal/CC/4T3.htm. 
1 34 Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 1 04 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 1 2 5  
(2004). 
1 35 Harriet S. Daggett, The Wife 's Action for a Separation of Property, 5 TUL. L. REV. 55, 5 7  
( 193 1  ) .  In an early Louisiana case, a husband petitioned for separation o f  property, arguing that 
wife was not contributing to the community and had become a "helpless burden." Hotard v. 
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who had no management capabilities and was subjected to her 
husband's whims as "head and master" of their community to ensure 
that her dowry would not be squandered136 and that future acquisitions 
would remain available for her support.137 With a judgment of 
separation of property, a wife could terminate the community property 
regime and seek immediate payment of the debt her husband owed to 
her. 1 38 The purpose of the judgment was "to take away from the 
husband any means of jeopardizing the property of his wife," and the 
mechanism whereby the judgment did that was to abolish the existing 
community regime between the spouses and to replace it with "a system 
in which the husband has no power over his wife' s  property"-a regime 
of separate property. 1 39 
The French standard for proving entitlement to a judgment of 
separation of property has always been rather vague. Historically, the 
wife was required to prove that "the disorder of the husband' s  affairs" 
gave cause for concern that his estate may not be sufficient to meet the 
wife's rights and claims. 140 The husband's  insolvency, his habitual and 
Hotard, 1 2  La. Ann. 1 45 ( 1 857). The court refused to grant the judgment, noting that: 
It may be true that among the rude and hardy tribes of German origin who introduced 
the custom of the matrimonial community . . .  the wife was the equal partner of her 
husband's  toil. . . . [I]n the change of manners which a higher civilization has 
produced, this prime reason for the community law has ceased to exist, yet the 
institution remains. . . . [A]ll authors are agreed that the husband cannot sue the wife 
for a separation of property, that being a privilege conceded only to the wife against 
her husband. 
Id Thus, it seems that courts viewed the necessity of the remedy as stemming not only from the 
wife's legal incapacity to manage her separate estate, but also out of a desire to protect the weak 
anJ non-equal partner wife in a community regime. A husband was not completely without 
means to bring the community to an end, however. He was entitled to petition for a separation 
from bed and board, which would bring equivalent effects as a judgment of separation of 
property. though the spouses would also be physically separated. PLANIOL, supra note 126, at 
Nos. 1 1 60-6 1 .  
I 3Ci The judgment of separation of property was especially valuable to a wife with a sizeable 
inheritance or other family property to protect. Now, such protection is neither needed nor 
afforded by a judgment of separation of property. Under the modem community property 
scheme. anything brought into the marriage or inherited by one of the spouses is his separate 
property. which he alone manages and which is not bound for the debts incurred by the other. 
A l� I Z .  Rl ·.V. STAT. * *  25-2 1 3 , 2 1 4(A)  (2007 ); CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE 
�* 32-')0J. 904 ( 2007); LA. CIV.  CODE AN . art. 2341 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 40-3-8 (2007) ; NEV. 
RIV.  STAT. **  1 2 3. UO, 1 23. 1 70 (2007 ); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26. 16.0 10, 26. 1 6.020 (2007); 
WIS. ST,\T. AN . ** 766.3 1 ( 8) ,  766.5 l ( l )(a) (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.00 1 ,  3. 1 0 1  
I Vernon 2007). A judgment o f  separation of property today protects only against a mishandling 
of the petitioning spouse ' s share in community property. 
1 ·1 7 Daggett. supra note 1 35, at 58; see also Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, 45 
LA .  L Rn . -1 1 7. 429 ( 1 984 ) .  
I .1X Daggett. supra note I 35.  at 6 1 -63 . I n  fact, seeking prompt execution o f  the judgment was 
a requirement of its continued effectiveness. Id. 
1 .1 '1 See PJ . ..\ l\ I OL. supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 83.  
I .JO French C. C1v.  1 804 art. 1 443. The evidence mustered by wife most often consisted of the 
test i mony of neighbors and friends as to the husband 's  mismanagement. Members of the 
com munity were more will ing to provide such testimony than one might expect. "While 
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extravagant spending, the sequestration of his property by court order, 
and his interdiction or insanity were considered sufficient forms of 
disorder.14 1  The legal formulation of the standard the wife had to meet 
to obtain a judgment of separation of property appeared rather onerous. 
In practice, however, at least early in the judgment's French 
existence, courts were willing to grant the judgment almost without 
exception. 142 Virtually every petition for separation of property prayed 
for was granted. 1 43 That this is true is not surprising when one considers 
the state of family law in France in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Divorce did not exist there until after the French 
Revolution . 1 44 And even when divorce became permissible, the 
possibility of a judgment of separation of property persisted, and the 
frequency with which courts granted judgments of separation of 
property demonstrates judicial commitment to "keep[ing] households 
together" where the rift between the spouses was not insurmountable. 145 
The French concept of the unilaterally-sought judgment of separation of 
property, then, has long provided quite a nice alternative to divorce. 146 
The effectiveness of the remedy has hinged upon its consequences. 
Obtaining a judgment of separation of property terminates the 
community property regime between the spouses. 147 And that 
termination has retroactive effect, dating back to the date of the filing of 
the request for judgment. 148 Thus, a spouse who has been awarded a 
neighbors, kin, and the legal system tolerated a certain level of physical abuse, poor husbanding 
of the household's resources-in terms of handling financial affairs, disorderly behavior, or 
application to work--elicited negative responses from kin and neighbors, and their cooperative 
testimony" was not so difficult to come by. HARDWICK, supra note 1 33,  at 1 12.  
Contemporary French law has retained the disorder of affairs ground, but expanded a 
spouse's ability to seek judgments of separation of property to scenarios in which "the disorder of 
the affairs, m isadministration or misconduct" of a spouse gives rise to the fear that the interest of 
the other will be imperiled. French C .  CJV. art. 1 580 (2008). 
14 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, 2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, Nos. 1 66-69. 
1 42 Requests for judgment appear to have been rather frequently lodged, and typically used not 
by the poorest of French citizens, but rather by the middle class wives of urban, commercial 
types. Hardwick, supra note 1 3 1 ,  at 1 6 3 .  
143 One study o f  petitions for separation o f  property filed between 1 600 and 1 670 found not 
even a single petition denied (including those that were opposed). Id. at 1 62-63. 
1 44 Id. at 1 58. 
145 Id. at 1 75 .  
1 46 Id. Mexico is another community property jurisdiction which allows a spouse to 
unilaterally petition for termination of the community property regime. To succeed in obtaining 
the judgment of separation of property, a Mexican spouse must offer proof that "the notorious 
negligence or poor administration of the managing partner threatens to ruin the other spouse, or 
diminish the common property considerably." C6digo Civil Federal [C.C.F.] [Federal Civil 
Code], as amended, art. 1 88, 2002 (Mex.) (English translation by Julio Romanach). See generally 
Loewy, supra note 1 26. 
1 47 "Separation abolishes in fact the system originally adopted, terminates the community of 
the spouses, and subjects them to a new system." PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 173. 
1 48 Id. (discussing the retroactivity of the French judgment) .  For the rule of retroactivity in 
Louisiana, see LA. Crv. CODE. art. 23 75 (2007). See also Harriet S. Daggett, The Wife 's Action 
for a Separation of Property, 5 TUL. L. REV. 55, 66 ( 1 9 3 1 ) . 
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judgment of separation of property would be entitled to manage alone 
all of the property he acquires, to keep the fruits of his property for 
himself, to acquire assets without creating a claim of ownership to those 
assets in the other spouse, and to be free of the liabilities incurred by the 
other after the termination of the community property regime. 1 49 
Essentially, though the spouses would remain married, their community 
regime would come to an end entirely and their property matters would 
be handled under the law applicable to ordinary co-owners . 1 50 
B. Contemporary Use of the Judgment of Separation of Property 
Only two American community property states provide such a 
unilateral mechanism for terminating the community property regime­
Wisconsin and Louisiana. 1 51 Wisconsin does not refer to the remedy, 
either in legislation or jurisprudence, as a judgment of separation of 
property. Still, Wisconsin law allows a spouse that can prove "gross 
mismanagement, waste, or absence" causing injury to get a court order 
terminating the mismanager's ability to manage community property, 
reclassifying marital property as separate property, dividing obligations 
between the spouses, and limiting the property of the nondebtor spouse 
which can be seized for the obligations incurred by the other. 1 52 The 
effect is essentially a judicial separation of property. The theoretical 
existence of this remedy in Wisconsin, however, has proved rather 
fruitless. Since the inception of the remedy in Wisconsin ' s  1984 
Marital Property Act, the remedy has not been considered in a single 
reported appellate decision. 
Louisiana stands as the only state, then, in which the remedy not 
only exists, but is used with some regularity. 1 53 That Louisiana follows 
French law on this point is not surprising. The source of nearly all of 
Louisiana's  private law, including the marital property regime, is 
French and Spanish law. 1 54 In this regard, Louisiana law seems to have 
1 -19 Daggett. supra note 1 3 5. at 68 ( 1931 ) .  
I 50  For exceptions, see LA.  CJV.  CODE ANN. arts. 2370-76 (2007) .  
1 5 1  See J .  Thomas Oldham. Mcmage111e111 o(the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 
5<1-SPG LAW & CONTE MP. PROBS. 99. 1 2 1 -22 ( 1 993 ) (describing the Louisiana and Wisconsin 
n:mcdics as "scnsibl [ c] . . . means for a spouse to limit the management powers of the other when 
that spouse irresponsibly exercises management power"). 
1 52 WIS. S L\T. ANN. * 766.70(4)(a) (2007 ) .  
1 5 3  S<'<'. e g  . . Cooper v .  Cooper. 509 So.  2d 6 1 6  (La. Ct .  App. 1 987)  (husband granted 
judgment of separation of property for wife's mismanagement in incurring numerous obligations 
by signing husband's name without his knowledge); Pan Am. Imp. Co., Inc. v. Buck, 452 So. 2d 
1 1 67 ( La. 1 984! (husband granted judgment of separation o f  property for wife's premarital 
cm�.:zz
.
lcmcnt obhgat1on after creditor sought garnishment of his earnings to satisfy the debt). 
� .  u Sc<' gc11era/�1· J.-R. Trahan. T/1c Co11tin11ing il!fluence of Le Droit Civil and El Derecho 
Cini i11 the Prirntc Lm1· o(Lo11isia11a, 63 LA. L .  REV. 1 0 1 9  (2004).  
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copied French law quite closely . 1 55 Thus, Louisiana' s  first systemic 
written body of law, the Digest of 1 808, provided that "(t]he wife may, 
during the marriage, petition against the husband for a separation of 
property, whenever her dowry is  in danger, owing to the 
mismanagement of the husband, or otherwise, or when the disorder of 
his affairs induces her to believe that his estate may not be sufficient to 
meet her rights and claims." 156 That rule was carried forward without 
significant change until 1 980. 1 57 
By the early 1990s, Louisiana' s head and master scheme had 
relatively recently been abolished and an equal management scheme 
substituted in its place. 1 58 The entirety of the state's  matrimonial 
regimes legislation was redrafted in keeping with the new and different 
regime. 1 59 Entire institutions were j ettisoned as outdated in the new 
equal management era. 1 60 
The j udgment of separation of property, however, retained its place 
in Louisiana law even in the revision. 1 61 Indeed, the equal management 
scheme made the judgment of separation of property even more relevant 
under the modem community property law than it had been for 
centuries. 1 62 Because the equal management regime gives spouses a 
great deal of power to manage the community in a way that may harm 
the other spouse's interest, the judgment of separation of property 
provides an otherwise unavailable method for a spouse who desires to 
stay married and simultaneously obtain much-needed protection from 
the other's  acts of mismanagement. 
Louisiana's community property revision did alter the judgment of 
separation of property, however, from its pre- 1 980 form. The remedy 
became gender neutral, with either spouse empowered to seek it upon 
1 55 Cf 1 804 French C. Civ. art. 1443. See also (Source Notes of) L.  MOREAU, LISLET, A 
DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS, 341 (Louisiana 
State University 1 968) (noting the source materials of the 1808 La. Digest article). 
156 1 808 La. Digest art. 86. 
1 57 LA . CJV. CODE ANN. art. 2399 ( 1 825); LA. Civ. CODE art. 2425 ( 1 8 70). By La. Acts 1978, 
No. 627, amended Civil Code article 2425 was to become effective January 1, 1 980 as Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:2856(A). Acts 1 978, No. 627 was repealed in its entirety by Acts 
1 979, No. 709, § 5, effective January 1 ,  1 980. The latter Act enacted current Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2374(A). 
1 58 Katherine S. Spaht & Cynthia Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative 
Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 84 ( 1 980). 
1 59 See generally id. (detailing the change from Louisiana's  head and master scheme to an 
equal management scheme). 
! 60 See Spaht, supra note 158, at 1 04-05. 
1 6 1 See also Spaht, supra note 1 58, at 1 04 n. 1 3  7 (and accompanying text). 
1 62 Before the shift toward equal management in community property regimes, Marcel Planiol, 
in commenting on the possibility of expanding the management powers of women to rectify the 
problem of excessive power given to husbands under the head and master scheme, reasoned that 
the change "might result in producing two incapable persons instead of one." PLANIOL, supra 
note 1 26,  at No. 9 1 1 .  
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proving a legal ground. 1 63 Essentially, equal management required that 
the "protections previously afforded the wife against the husband's 
mismanagement" be extended to the husband for the wife's 
mismanagement as well. 1 64 Moreover, some onerous and somewhat 
bizarre requirements for obtaining the judgment and making it effective 
were removed from the law. For instance, both the old French law and 
the pre-revision Louisiana law required the party seeking the judgment 
of separation of property to publish notice of its issuance in a local 
newspaper three times for the judgment to be given effect.165 After the 
revision, third party rights depend upon recordation, not publication. 1 66 
Moreover, the old Louisiana law relating to judgments of separation of 
property did not allow spouses who had terminated their community 
property regime to reestablish it under any circumstances.167 Now, that 
oddity is cured and spouses may reestablish the community property 
regime at any time by matrimonial agreement. 1 68 In short, what was 
historically an onerous cause of action in Louisiana has been made 
simpler. 
More importantly, the grounds on which a unilateral petition for 
separation of property could be granted were expanded substantially 
163 Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2425 ( 1 870) with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374(A) 
( 1 980). 
164 Tete, supra note 1 24, at 528. 
1 65 1 804 French C. C !V. art. 1 445. See also PLANIOL, supra note 1 26, at No. 1 1 78; LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 2429 ( 1 870). 
1 66 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2376 (2007). 
Creditors of the spouses with rights acquired before the judgment of separation of property had 
under the old law and continue today to have the ability to set aside the judgment between the 
spouses if it is obtained "in fraud of their rights." Id; see also Daggett, supra note 1 3 5 ,  at 64-65. 
1 67 Daggett, supra note 1 35, at 7 1 .  French law allowed for the reestablishment of the 
community regime between spouses after a judgment of separation of property, though the 
reeslablishment could only take place with the consent of both spouses. PLANIOL, supra note 
1 26, at No. 1 200 ("Wife alone can not bring community back in operation if she thinks it 
advisable to renounce the separation. The separation judgment could have created a situation 
which is as advantageous to her husband as it is to her; hence it can be rescinded only by a mutual 
agreement."). 
168 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2375(8) (2007). Such a reestablishment would bring its own 
problems. The constant possibility of modification of a couple 's marital problems creates 
unpredictability and instability. 
Within the marriage the continuing possibility of change from whatever the present 
regime is. be 1t community or separation of property, could have the same effect as a 
pebble in 
.
one's shoe-a constant source of irritation until one takes the thing off. The 
wife, havmg previously agreed to her husband' s  demand for a regime of separation of 
property. may. as she perceives her security melting away, begin a campaign for the 
remst1tutmn of community. The husband, who may have initially decided to bear the 
mconvemence of a community. will always have the opportunity to change his  mind 
and begm his own campaign for a revision of the regime. Third parties dealing with 
the husband will never be able to rely completely on the fact that he is separate in 
property. 
Tete. supru note 1 24. at 534. 
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after the equal management revision. 169 Until 1980, Louisiana retained 
the French source provision' s  language on the requisite grounds for 
seeking the judgment. That is, a wife could obtain a judgment of 
separation of property only upon proof that her dowry was endangered 
by her husband' s  mismanagement or that "the disorder of his affairs" 
made her fear that his estate may not suffice to meet his legal duty to 
her . 1 10 Essentially, the wife was required to prove that her husband was 
in a state of "financial embarrassment." The existence of liabilities 
exceeding assets was enough. 1 7 1  Further, a wife ' s  showing "that her 
husband had suffered heavy losses (of slaves) and that the financial and 
economic conditions of the country were in a precarious condition" 
sufficed to satisfy her burden. 1 72 
The modem version of Louisiana's  article departs from French law 
and provides four different grounds on which a judgment of separation 
of property sought by a spouse may be granted. 1 73 Two of those 
grounds allow the court to grant a judgment of separation of property 
incident to the filing of a petition for divorce, or after a showing that the 
spouses have been living separate and apart for a statutorily prescribed 
period even without the filing of a petition for divorce. 1 74 Another 
ground allows the court to grant a spouse, on unilateral request, a 
judgment of separation of property where the other is an absent 
person. 1 75 All of those grounds are useful only for spouses no longer 
living together and can therefore have little effect in providing 
incentives to spouses either to divorce or to stay together. One ground, 
however, persists in the revision as available even for spouses intending 
to remain together and to maintain all aspects of their marital 
relationship other than the marital property regime. Specifically, 
modem Louisiana law allows either spouse to unilaterally request a 
judgment of separation of property "[ w ]hen [his] interest . . .  in a 
community property regime is threatened to be diminished by the fraud, 
fault, neglect, or incompetence of the other spouse, or by the disorder of 
I 69 Id. at 529. 
1 70 See Daggett, supra note 1 3 5. 
1 7 1  Id. 
I 72 Id. at 59.  
173 LA.  CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374 (2007). 
1 74 LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2374(C) & (D) (2007). The effect of a judgment of divorce in 
Louisiana is retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition on which judgment of divorce is 
granted. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 59 (2007). Nonetheless, it may be valuable for a spouse to 
seek a judgment of separation of property incident to a pending divorce proceeding, because it 
may bring an earlier termination date of the community in the case of a disturbance of the initial 
filing date because of dismissal of a divorce petition or a reconventional demand on which 
judgment of divorce is granted. See KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, 1 6  
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE SERIES § 7 .5 (Thomson West 3 d  ed. 2007). 
175 LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 2374(B). An absent person is a person who has no representative 
in this state and whose whereabouts are not known and cannot be ascertained by diligent effort. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 47 (2007). 
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the affairs of the other spouse . . . .  " 1 76 
With the elimination of many of the antiquated and overly 
cumbersome features of the judgment of separation of property from 
Louisiana law, the remedy is much improved from its pre-1980 state. 
Still, because judgments of separation of property in Louisiana have 
always been regarded with a certain amount of disfavor, 1 77 they are not 
used in a manner that lives up to their potential as a disincentive to 
divorce. In recent years, the Louisiana courts have required rather 
serious acts before granting judgments of separation of property on 
grounds of mismanagement. 1 78 The disorder of a wife's affairs 
stemming from her prenuptial embezzlement debt has qualified. 1 79 And 
a wife incurring multiple obligations by signing her husband's name 
without his consent or knowledge, resulting in serious financial disarray 
of the community, led to a judgment of separation of property. 1 80 The 
severity of the mismanagement in these cases indicates that rather 
serious acts of mismanagement are required. In practice, the judgment 
of separation of property is simply granted on mismanagement grounds 
only in the most serious cases. 
C. A Call for More Extensive A doption of the Remedy 
The theoretical utility of the remedy should not be underestimated. 
It provides perhaps the only means for a spouse who cannot obtain joint 
agreement to terminate the community property regime to gain a 
measure of protection from the other 's state of financial disarray, 1 s 1 and 
yet to maintain the marital bond that modern society so clearly views as 
worthy of protection. 182 
1 76 LA. C1v. CODE. art 2374(A). For cases in which this standard has been found satisfied, see 
s11pra note 1 5 3 .  
1 77 Daggett. s11pru note 135, at 64. 
1 78 Numerous judgments of separation of property are granted annually as incidental relief in 
divorce proceedings. See, e.g. . Brar v. Brar, 796 So. 2d 8 1 0  (La. Ct. App. 200 I ). 
1 79 Pan Am. Imp. Co., Inc. v. Buck, 452 So. 2d I I 67 (La. 1984) . 
1 80 Cooper v. Cooper, 509 So. 2d 6 1 6  (La. Ct. App. 1 987). 
1 8 1  Daggett. supra note l 35, at 71 ('The action is available as the only method for doing away 
with the community system between spouses who do not like it. . . .  "). That may have been true 
when the spouses could not perfect matrimonial agreements during the existence of their 
marriage. Since 1 980, however, postnuptial contracts have been permitted in Louisiana. LA. 
Cl\' .  Com:. ANN. art. 2329 cmt. (b) (2007). Thus, spouses who agree on setting aside the 
community property regime can, by simply executing a matrimonial agreement and complying 
with the proper procedure (including obtaining court approval ),  live separate in property. If it  is  
merely one spouse dissatisfied with the regime, however, the possibility of entering into a 
matrimonial agreement to terminate the community property regime is of little use. A unilateral 
method such as the judgment of separation of property may be the only option. 
I X:' There is some question as to the pragmatism of viewing a judgment of separation of 
property as a means of keeping spouses together that, absent its availability, may divorce. Some 
scholars have argued that a spouse's mere allegation that the other has committed acts of  
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With the Louisiana and Wisconsin exceptions, a legal mechanism 
for a spouse to unilaterally seek termination of the community property 
regime is conspicuously absent from the American community property 
regimes. Remedies akin to a judgment of separation of property may be 
available in community property jurisdictions to spouses who have 
physically separated, and the existence of such remedies is certainly 
necessary for the protection of spouses headed toward divorce. 183 
Moreover, at least one community property state-Nevada-allows for 
the issuance of a court order that functions much like a judgment of 
separation of property when an elderly spouse is "institutionalized," for 
the purpose of providing an income stream to the spouse left at home 
and to allow the institutionalized spouse to qualify for certain 
governmental services.1 84 Finally, every community property state now 
allows spouses to opt out of the community property regime by 
contract, even during marriage. 1 85 These methods of getting something 
akin to termination of the community property regime, however, are 
wholly insufficient to provide relief for the average spouses who are 
still living together and do not mutually agree upon the need for 
termination of the community property regime. 
Quite simply, a court-monitored mechanism of terminating the 
community property regime that a spouse may unilaterally seek is 
needed in every community property state to preserve marriage. Such 
an institution need not be created from scratch. The judgment of 
separation of property stands at the ready to fill the gap in marital 
mismanagement sufficient to warrant the grant of a judgment of separation of property may so 
fracture the spousal bond that divorce is inevitable. "One wonders how those who are responsible 
[for Louisiana's revision of the judgment of separation of property rules] envision bedroom 
conversation between spouses after one has filed suit against the other alleging 'fraud, fault, 
neglect, or incompetence."' Tete, supra note 1 24, at 529. Tete argues that new undercurrents of 
distress in the family may even "tip the scale in favor of divorce." Id. at 499. Though no 
empirical work has been done to record long-term outcomes for spouses who have sought 
judgments of separation of property in recent times, studies of spouses who sought the judgments 
early in French history seem to demonstrate no insurmountable impact on marital harmony. 
Couples wherein one spouse sought and obtained a judgment of separation of property 
unilaterally typically persisted in living together, and often had more children. Hardwick, supra 
note 1 3 1 ,  at 1 77. For some couples, however, increased tension and disagreement about the 
financial implications of the judgment, the sharing of expenses in the future, and other 
uncertainties prompted physical separation. Id. at 178 .  
1 83 See, e.g. , N.M. STAT. § 40-4-3 (2007). 
1 84 NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.259 (2007); see also Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Judiciary, 65th Sess. 1430 (Nev. 1 989) (testimony of Hank Cavallera, Senior Law Center, 
Washoe County); id. at 143 1 (testimony of Nancy Angres, Deputy Attorney General, Nevada 
State Welfare Division). The Nevada legislature specifically recognized the need for such a 
statute to disincentivize divorce. In the discussions surrounding the passage of § 123.259, 
"Senator Wagner told of a case dealing with the division of assets where the wife was told her 
only recourse to provide a division of assets was to divorce her husband of 60 plus years." Id. at 
1432. 
l 85 Carroll, supra note 29, at 26 n. 1 3 0  (and accompanying text) (2007). 
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property law. 1 86 It is an ancient creation that is too infrequently used 
today. Implicit in the allowance of a judgment of separation of property 
is the notion that, even in community property states, "there might be 
both a family and a marriage relationship without there being a 
community relationship." 187 The remedy provides an almost ideal 
balance for a community property state. Allowing a spouse to 
unilaterally seek a judgment of separation of property adequately serves 
the community property state's need to channel couples into the marital 
property regime the state sanctions, while still allowing them to set 
aside that regime when they might otherwise have to resort to setting 
aside their union altogether. 
Ill .  THE INABILITY O F  A SPOUSE TO MAKE A TESTAMENTARY TRANSFER 
OF HER INTEREST IN THE OTHER SPOUSE'S RETIREMENT PLAN 
When it comes to the death of a spouse, state community property 
rules in and of themselves do not do much to incentivize divorce. 
Rather, it is the federal government which plays the primary role in 
sending the wrong message about marriage after the death of a spouse 
in community. Specifically, when it comes to pensions, I 88 the federal 
rules of preemption provide some spouses with a rather strong 
economic push toward divorce. 
Each of the nine American community property states recognizes 
pensions as an asset of the community, at least to the extent the right to 
the pension was earned by the labor of a spouse during the existence of 
the community property regime. 189 In so doing, community property 
states recognize the nonparticipant spouse's interest in the pension, 
which is thus shared between the spouses, either equally or equitably,190 
regardless of which spouse is directly responsible for the pension's 
existence . 1 9 1  This treatment of pensions is consistent with the 
I �6 Daggett, supra note 1 35, at 72. 
I X7 Harry M. Cross, The Community Proper ty law in Washington, in COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
I N  COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 169 (Jan P. Channatz & Harriet S. Daggett eds., 1 955) .  
1 xx The term "pension" in  this section is  intended in its broadest sense-to signify any 
retirement benefit provided to an employee, whether public or private, defined benefit or defined 
contribution. 
1 X<J Cynthia A. Samuel & Katherine S. Spaht, Fixing What 's Broke: Amending ERISA to Allow 
C111111111111i1r Property to App(r upon the Death ofa Partic ipant 's Spouse, 35 FAM. L.Q. 425, 43 1.  
1 90 Arizona, Texas, Washington, Nevada, and Idaho are equitable division community 
property states. Martin v. Martin. 752 P.2d 1 038,  1 043 (Ariz. 1 988); Hailey v. Hailey, 176 
S.W.Jd 3 74. 379 (Tex. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Tower, 780 P.2d 863, 865; IDAHO CODE § 
:12-
_
7 I 2( I ) (a) (2007). Louisiana, Cal ifornia, Wisconsin and New Mexico all provide for equal 
d t \"ISIO!l. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE art. 2550 (West 2007); WIS. 
STAT. A'il\. � 766.3 1 ( 3 ) ; Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 1 82, 1 92 (N.M. 1 993).  
1 9 1 Samuel. supra note 1 89. 
. 
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overarching aim of the community property regime-to treat spouses as 
partners sharing in the risks and rewards that a life in common brings. 1 92 
And, in many cases, at least, that recognition of the nonparticipant 
spouse's interest accrued during marriage continues regardless of when 
the marriage ends and under what circumstances. If the spouses 
divorce, for instance, the nonparticipant spouse in a community 
property state may be recognized as owner of her interest in the 
participant spouse's  pension and may be able to exercise management 
prerogatives over that interest. i 93 Death as a cause for termination of 
the community property regime typically brings a similar effect. If the 
nonparticipant spouse 's death ends the marriage, some community 
property states will continue to recognize the interest the nonparticipant 
spouse had in the other's pension during the marriage, insofar as state 
law may respect a testamentary transfer of that interest to a third person 
upon the nonparticipant spouse' s  death. 1 94 
Perhaps not surprisingly, federal law does not share the same view 
of the nonparticipant spouse's  relationship to the participant spouse 's 
pension. The most significant piece of federal legislation regulating 
pensions, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),195 
has been held to preempt the application of state community property 
law,196 and BR1SA's treatment of the nonparticipant spouse is, in many 
cases, substantially different than that in the community property 
states. 1 97 
BRISA operates in much the same manner as state community 
property law in the case of divorce. The nonparticipant spouse's 
interest is recognized, and he or she is given ownership, control, or 
some combination thereof over her interest in the divorce judgment. 1 98 
If the nonparticipant spouse predeceases the participant, however, the 
United States Supreme Court has interpreted BRISA in a manner quite 
unfavorable to the nonparticipant spouse. Specifically, the Court has 
held that the purpose of and policies supporting BRISA preclude any 
recognition of the ability of a nonparticipant spouse to make a 
192 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 433 (describing marriage as "an economic partnership"). 
1 93 Id. at 440-4 1 .  
l 94 For example, in Allard v. Frec h, the Texas Supreme Court held that a nonemployee 
spouse 's community property interest in a private pension passed to her heirs at her death, when 
her death was the event that terminated the marriage). 754 S.W.2d 1 1 1  (Tex. 1 998); Snyder v. 
Tuscon Police Public Safety Personnel Ret. System Bd., 32 P.3d 420 (Ariz. 200 1 )  (share of an 
employee spouse's pension being paid to the divorced nonemployee spouse does not terminate 
with the death of the nonemployee spouse). 
1 95 29 U.S.C.A. § 1 00 1  et seq. (2006). 
l 96 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S.  833 ( 1 997). Boggs arrived at the Supreme Court after a circuit 
split as to the ability of a nonparticipant spouse to transfer her interest in a spouse's pension by 
testament. See Alabamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 )  (ERISA preempts testamentary 
transfer); Boggs v. B oggs, 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1 996) (testamentary transfer permissible). 
197 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 429-30. 
198 29 U.S.C.A. § ! 056(d)(3) (2006). 
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testamentary transfer of  her interest in the participant spouse ' s  
pension. 199 The ultimate effect of ERISA and the jurisprudence 
interpreting it is to give greater rights to divorced nonparticipant 
spouses in their former partners' pensions than those afforded to 
predeceasing spouses.200 As such, ERISA, and the United States 
Supreme Court ' s  interpretation of its preemptive effect in c ommunity 
property states, may incentivize divorce, particularly in cases in which 
the nonparticipant spouse is expected to die before the p articipant 
spouse.201 The aim of such a divorce would be to regain the 
testamentary control of which ERISA and the federal rules of 
preemption deprive nonparticipant spouses. 
A.  The Ugly Result of the Supreme Court 's Interpretation of ERISA 
in Boggs 
In its 1 997 decision in Boggs v. Boggs,202 the United States 
Supreme Court changed the landscape of interaction between state 
community property rules and federal rules governing pensions in a 
significant way. The Boggs case pitted the second-wife-designated 
beneficiary of a participant spouse' s  pension against the sons of the 
participant' s predeceasing first wife, who attempted to transfer the 
interest she earned during her community with the participant in her 
will . 20> 
The applicable state law on community property-Louisiana's­
recognized such testamentary transfers made by the nonparticipant 
spouse.204 But E RISA governed the pension at issue in Boggs, and 
ER ISA ' s  anti-al ienation provisions preclude a pension administrator 
from di sbursing funds (either in the nature of a survivor' s annuity or 
monthly annuity payments that the participant spouse receives when he 
retires) to a person other than the participant or his designated 
beneficiary, unless an express exception is provided.2os The state and 
federal ru les regarding the nonparticipant spouse's  ability to transfer her 
interest i n  a pension upon death seemed to directly clash in Boggs, and 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to tackle the issue of 
whether the two systems could be afforded any harmonious 
interpretation, or if they could not, which system of rules trumped. 
In a decision that has been more criticized than lauded since its 
l 'l'I /Jogg�. 520 U.S.  at 843-44. 
2 o11  Samw.:L supra note 1 89. at 426 . 
.:'Ill .\'<'!' i11/i'a text accompanying note 249. 
2112 'i20 U . S .  :ff� ( 1 99 7 )  . 
.:'II.> /d at 8.'\6-83 7 . 
.:'ll� Id at X.� X  . 
.:'O� 29 U .S.C.A.  � 1 056(d)( I )-( 3 )  (2006 ).  
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promulgation,206 the Court held that ERISA preempts the application of 
state community property rules governing pensions.207 To reach that 
result, the Court considered the language of ERISA itself, which 
contains a preemption provision that is exceptionally broad: "The 
provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit p lan 
described in . . .  this title. "208 And even beyond the text of that 
preemption provision, the Court viewed the purpose of ERJSA, which it 
articulated as "to provide a stream of income to participants and their 
beneficiaries" as incompatible with a state law which allowed someone 
other than a participant or beneficiary to acquire an interest in a 
pension.209 
The result was a disturbing one, both for the litigants in Boggs and 
for all nonparticipant spouses in community property states .  The first 
wife in Boggs was married to the participant for thirty of the thirty-six 
years of employment that resulted in his ultimate pension benefit.2 10 
During her life, she was entitled to recognition of her ownership interest 
in the pension, which would have neared 50 percent.2 1 1  But the Boggs 
court's interpretation of ERISA ultimately divested her of all ownership 
rights in and control over this valuable asset2 12 which she helped to 
accrue during thirty years of marriage. Had the first Mrs. Boggs 
survived, even if she had divorced her husband, she would have fared 
much better. Congress has written an exception into ERJSA' s rules 
which free a plan administrator, normally authorized to disburse 
pension benefits only to the participant spouse or his designated 
206 Compare Tristan E. Propst, Boggs v. Boggs: The Fifth Circuit Finds ERJSA Does not 
Preempt Louisiana Community Property Law, 7 1  TUL. L. REV. 1005 ( 1997), and Julie McDaniel 
Dal lison, Disappearing Interests: ERJSA Impliedly Preempts the Predeceasing Nonemployee 
Spouse 's Community Property Interest in the Employee 's Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477 
( 1 997). and Alvin J. Golden, A Preliminary Analysis of Boggs v. Boggs-and the Problems it 
Does Not Answer, 23 ACTEC Notes 97 ( 1 997), and Tony Vecino, Boggs v. Boggs: State 
Community Property and Succession Rights Wallow in ERJSA 's Mire, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 571 ( 1998), and Erica S .  Phillips, Equality in Life, Inequality in Death: The Ramifications 
of'the United States Supreme Court Decision in Boggs v. Boggs, 34 IDAHO L. REV . 623 ( 1 998), 
and Heather J. Rose, Boggs v. Boggs: Creating Real-Life Cinderellas, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
27 1 ( 1 999), and Samuel, supra note 1 89 (all criticizing Boggs), with Meridith H. Bogart, State 
Doctrine.1· of' Substantial Compliance: A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal 
Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447 (2003), and Stephen F. Befort & Christopher 
.I. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. I 
(2000), and Sam H. Roberson, Supreme Court 's Boggs Decision Makes Sense, NAT'L L.J., Jul. 7, 
1 997, at A 1 7  (endorsing the Court's resolution of the conflict in Boggs). 
207 Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 ( 1 997). 
208 29 U.S.C.A. § l 1 44(a) (2007); Boggs. 520 U. S .  at 84 1 .  
209 Id at 852-53. 
2 1 0  Id. a t  836. 
2 1 1 Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 9 1 9, 920 (La. 1 978). The nonparticipant spouse is entitled to the 
"portion of pension attributable to creditable service during existence of community . . .  / pension 
attnbutable to total creditable service x Yi x annuity (or lump-sum payment)." Id. at 924. 
2 1 2  Vecino. supra note 206, at 572. 
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beneficiary, to pay a former spouse in community who has obtained a 
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) upon divorce.2 1 3  In cases of 
termination of the community regime by divorce, then, ERISA 
recognizes the contributions of the nonparticipant spouse during 
marriage.2 14 The Boggs court found it significant that Congress made 
no such exception in ERISA, either in the QDRO provisions or 
elsewhere, which allowed a nonparticipant spouse in community to 
retain her interest and to control it by testament if she predeceased the 
participant.2 1 s  The ultimate effect of the Boggs decision, then, i s  to strip 
nonparticipant spouses in community property states "of their property 
rights in the [participant] spouses' pension plans, except when the 
spouses divorce."2 1 6 
The Boggs decision is troubling because the court's holding that 
E RISA preempts the application of state community property rules 
regarding testamentary transfers by nonparticipant spouses "creates an 
absurd dichotomy between marriages that end in divorce and marriages 
that end by death."2 1 7  The Supreme Court acknowledged that 
inconsistency, but held that "Congress has decided to favor the living 
over the dead and we must respect its policy."2 18 One might question 
whether that is true. A predeceasing participant spouse is empowered 
under ERISA to make a testamentary transfer of her interest in the 
pension.2 1 9  About this inconsistency, the Court simply noted that 
"ERISA does not concern itself with what a pension fund 
beneficiary . . .  does with his pension money at his death."220 
Inconsistencies in treatment abound, and the Supreme Court did nothing 
in Boggs but perpetuate unjustified distinctions between participant and 
nonparticipant ability to control the interest each has earned under state 
law and between treatment of spouses in marriages ending with divorce 
and those ending with the death of the nonparticipant. 
Even beyond these inconsistencies in treatment, the effect Boggs 
has on state community property law is disturbing. "Pension law is 
2 1 .1 29 U.S.C.A. * 1 056(d)( 3 )  (2006). The QDRO exception to ERISA was enacted as part of 
the l 984 amendments to the REA ( Retirement Equity Act) to define a nonparticipant spouse's  
community property interest i n  a pension plan covered by ERISA. Boggs, 520 U.S.  at 849-50. 2 1 4 Id. a l 848. 
2 1 5  Sc<' it!. at 847-848. 
2 I <> Ph i l l ips. s11pra note 206. al 624. 
2 I 7 Iii. at MS. 
2 1  x /Joggs. 520 U.S.  at 854. 8111 .l'l:'I.' Samuel. supra note 1 89, at 442 ("The comparison where 
testamentary power is concerned is not between a l iving spouse and a dead spouse but between two dead nonpar1
_
1c1pant spouses. one of whom had been divorced from the participant and the other had not . If Congress's mtent was to favor the fonner, then Congress has favored the d1nin:cd over the und1vorced.") . 
. -' l <J Phi l l ip� . su'!ra note 206. at 644-45. This is not true of a survivor's annuity however. Id. .'ice a/.111 29 lJ . S .C.A. * 1 055(d) (  I )( A ) (2006). 
2211  Boggs. 520 U . S .  at 864-65. 
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federalized"22 1 under the Boggs court' s interpretation of ERISA, and the 
result is to "unexpectedly alter[] an otherwise predictable system of 
property ownership and succession under state law and, in its wake, 
leave[] many married couples with uncertain future estate plans."222 
Lest one think that such an effect is insignificant, it should be recalled 
that there are roughly 90 million residents, "with perhaps $ 1  trillion in 
retirement plans" in the nine American community property states.223 
"[T]he Supreme Court has effectively eliminated the community 
property states '  definitions of property, at least as it pertains to property 
interests acquired by the marital community in ERISA qualifying 
pension plans" for each of those eighty million residents.224 
Boggs even carries unfortunate implications for the forty-one non­
community property states. The United States Supreme Court's view 
that ERISA preempts the application of state law is not limited to the 
law in a community property state that recognizes a nonparticipant 
spouse 's interest in a pension.225 The Court' s  broadly articulated view 
of preemption would likewise prevent the application of all state law 
regarding beneficiary designation, for instance.226 The law of several 
states provides that a spouse designated as a beneficiary on a 
participant's pension loses that designation, either by waiver or a 
doctrine of revocation, upon divorce, even if the participant spouse does 
not act to change the beneficiary designation before his death.227 
Because state law on beneficiary designation may "relate to" ERISA 
plans, one would expect the Supreme Court to afford to ERISA's 
preemption clause the same broad reading it did in Boggs, and to find 
state law preempted.228 Congress' failure to expressly approve of 
testamentary transfers by the nonparticipant spouse was a part of the 
22 1 Phillips, supra note 206, at 639. 
222 Vecino, supra note 206, at 572. 
223 Boggs, 520 U.S. at 840. Justice Kennedy estimated the population of community property 
states at 80 million in 1 997. Id. Population estimates for 2007 by (community property) state 
are: Arizona - 6,33 8,755; California - 36,553,2 1 5 ; Idaho - 1 ,499,402; Louisiana - 4,293,204; 
Nevada - 2,565,382; New Mexico - 1 ,969,9 1 5 ;  Texas - 23,904,380; Washington - 6,468,424; 
Wisconsin - 5,60 1 ,640. GCT-T l POPULATION ESTIMATES, us CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION 
ESTIMATES PROGRAM (2007), http://factfinder.census.gov. Ninety million residents is therefore a 
more accurate estimate today. 
224 Phillips, supra note 206, at 624. Justice Breyer questioned the majority's view that 
Congress intended such an effect: "Obviously, Congress did not intend to pre-empt all state laws 
that govern property ownership. After all, someone must own an interest in ERISA plan benefits. 
Nor, for similar reasons, can one believe that Congress intended to pre-empt state laws 
concerning testamentary bequests . . . .  The question, 'who owns the property? ' needs an answer. 
Ordinari ly, where federal law does not provide a specific answer, state law will have to do so." 
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 8 6 1  (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
225 29 U.S.C.A. § l 144(a) (2007). 
226 See Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 437-38. 
227 See UNIF. PRO BA TE CODE § 2-804(b )( I )  (2007), (adopted by eighteen states). 
228 Phillips, supra note 206, at 646. 
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Court's rationale for finding them unauthorized by ERISA,229 and the 
same failure to expressly approve of waivers or revocations of 
beneficiary designation may cause problems here. The Court has 
granted certiorari to resolve precisely this issue in a case to be heard 
during its 2008 term.230 And while the Boggs holding that ERISA 
preempts the application of state law will undoubtedly not be overruled 
in this case, it is hoped that the Court will shed some light on the scope 
of ERISA ' s  preemption provision. Perhaps such a clarification would 
aid our understanding of precisely what community property rules 
E RISA preempts. 
B. State Law A lternatives 
If the preemption held by Boggs to preclude the application of state 
community property rules were lifted, nonparticipant spouses would 
generally gain testamentary control over the pension interests they own 
in community property states. 23 1 In six of the nine American 
community property states, pensions provided by private employers 
would be classified as community assets even when that classification 
occurs after the community has terminated by death. 232 And "in these 
community property states, it follows from the classification of the 
retirement plan as community property that half of the p l an e arned by [a 
participant spouse] during the marriage is subject to [the other spouse's] 
testamentary disposition just as is half of the community house or any 
other community asset. "233 It is nothing more than the application of 
ERISA, then, that depri ves the nonparticipant spouse of the o wnership 
of an asset that the principles of community property protect for her as a 
result of her efforts exerted during marriage to the participant spouse. 
229 flog�s. 520 U.S.  at 847. 
2.111 Kennedy v. Plan Adm'r for Dupont Sav. & Inv. Plan, No. 07-636 2008 WL 423542 , at * l  
( h:b. 19. 2008). 
2.1 1 Samuel .  supra note 1 89, at 426. 
2-'2 Id. at
_ 
43 1 n .28. See also CAL. FAM . CODE § 26 1 0  (West 2007) (abolishing California's 
terminable 111terest rule); Alabamis v. Roper, 937 F.3d 1 450, 146 1  (9th Cir. 1 99 1 )  (Fletcher, 
Cin:uit .Justice. dissenting) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 1 426 (2008)_(by implication); Wolff v. 
Wolff. 929 P.2d 9 1 6. 920 (Nev. 1 996); Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d l 1 1  (Tex. App. 1 988), cert. 
cle111<'d. 488 U.S. 1 006 ( 1 989); Wts. STAT. ANN. § 766.3 1 (3 )  ( 2007) ( nonparticipant spouse's 
interest ter111 111atcs at the death of the nonparticipant spouse if he or she predeceases the 
part 1( 1pant spouse); Ruggles v. Ruggles, 860 P.2d 1 82 (N.M. 1 993); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 722 
P.2d 2.�0 ( l\ riz. 1 986). 
Fewer states
_ 
would allow a nonparticipant spouse to make a testamentary transfer of her 
111tncst 1 11 the part1c1pant 's  pensi_on plan offered by a public employer. See also Samuel, supra 
not� 1 89. at 432 n.29 (descnb111g the rationale behind treating public and private pensions 
d i t krrntly 111 this comex_t, 111clud111g that most governmental plans are defined benefit plans with 
a i�;��ro;'w rang.: of d1stnbut1on options than that possible under a defined contribution plan). 
- -'-' Samuel. supra note 1 89. at 43 1 -32. 
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C. Proposals for Rectifying the Boggs Inequities 
1 963 
This disconnect in the testamentary control afforded a 
nonparticipant spouse under state community property rules, on the one 
hand, and ERISA, on the other, needs to be remedied. The Boggs 
decision created so many inconsistencies and inequities that it naturally 
sparked a great deal of interest in the issue.234 Still, despite repeated 
calls for change by an overwhelming number of scholars in the field,235 
both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have failed to 
intervene. 
Boggs could be overruled. The United States Supreme Court could 
relax its interpretation of BRISA as preempting the application of state 
community property rules, at least insofar as the testamentary control of 
the nonparticipant spouse's interest goes. After all, ERISA is silent on 
the matter of testamentary transfers, and state law might be viewed in a 
light that makes it compatible with ERISA.236 This will almost certainly 
not happen. With the tenth anniversary of the Boggs decision now 
behind us, the rule the case establishes, flawed as it may be, has come to 
be firmly entrenched in the pension arena.237 It' s  unlikely that the 
modem Supreme Court, even with the turnover of two justices since the 
rendering of the Boggs decision, will feel any less hamstrung by the 
broad preemption clause in ERIS A than the 1 997 Court did. 238 
A more plausible solution for remedying the inappropriately 
divergent solutions provided by ERISA and state community property 
law is for C ongress to amend ERISA.239 A number of scholars have 
called for just such a change in the wake of Boggs, and some have 
234 Several states have created guidelines to help employees navigate Boggs. See, e.g. , 
Marjorie A. Rogers et al .,  Overcoming the Boggs Dilemma in Community Property States, TAX 
ADVISER (September ! ,  1 999); Cheryl Weller, Supreme Court Rules that State Statute 
Invalidating Designation ol Ex- W1je as Beneficiary upon Divorce is Preempted by ER/SA, 7/01 
METRO. CORP. COUNS. 22, col. I (200 1 ) ; Susan M. Kayser, The Pre-emption Problem: Lower 
Courts Will Continue to Struggle with Critical ER/SA Questions Since Several Cases This Term 
lefi Them Unanswered, 23 CONN. L. TRIB. 16 (July 2 1 ,  1 997). 
235 Samuel, supra note I 89, at 426. 
236 In Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 446, the authors suggest that state community property rules 
might be hannonized with ERJSA by allowing the heirs of the nonparticipant spouse to seek 
satisfaction of her share, not from the plan administrator, which would run afoul of ERISA, but 
rather from the beneficiary himself through some reimbursement of other monetary claim. 
237 A March 2008 Westlaw Keycite of Boggs yielded 1 ,638 results. 
238 Justice Sandra Day O'Cormor and Chief Justice Will iam Relmquist no longer sit on the 
Court. Both Justices joined Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent in Boggs (voting to affinn the 
judgment of the Fifth Circuit). Boggs, 520 U.S. at 854. 
239 Such an amendment would not alleviate all divergence in rules regarding testamentary 
control of the nonparticipant spouse. See supra notes 23 1-233 and accompanying text. Still , an 
amendment to ERISA would be a vast improvement, as it would eliminate the frustration of the 
general community property policy-sharing of the acquets and gains of the marriage-that the 
Boggs decision caused. 
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provided detailed proposals for modification.240 Expanding ERISA's 
existing definition of QDROs to include probate orders, for instance, 
which would allow the plan administrator to transfer an interest to a 
person other than the designated beneficiary, has been proposed.241 
Narrowing ERISA's preemption clause is an even more popular 
proposa1.242 Most scholars view the extreme breadth of that provision 
as the source of the problem with Boggs.243 When ERISA was initially 
considered in the United States House of Representatives, its 
preemption clause spoke to "matters expressly covered by the federal 
law, such as reporting, disclosure, fiduciary and funding duties, and 
vesting and nonforfeitability provisions."244 This narrow clause was 
consistent with the purpose of ERISA ' s  passage-to remedy rampant 
pension administrator abuses and to protect employees from abuse of 
this significant asset.245 By the time of ERISA's enactment, however, 
the preemption provision had been expanded to include its current 
"relation" language.246 The purpose of the change was to "prevent 
litigation over the scope and meaning of the clause . . . . Obviously, this 
attempt at avoiding litigation has failed. Since the Supreme Court' s  
first preemption decision [in 1 98 1 ]  i t  has handed down a n  average of 
one opinion on the subject per year."247 Congress could take steps 
toward solving the problem either by reverting to the preemption 
language included in the original bill,248 or by developing still different 
language that narrows the domain of ERISA' s  preemption of state 
community property rules. 
D. The Divorce Incentive Underlying Boggs 
What is perhaps most disturbing about the Boggs court's 
2411 Two law professors' proposal for change even resulted in a bill to amend ERISA which 
was introduc..:d into the United States Senate. See S. 1 6 1 6, 1 08th Cong. (2003). The bill was 
referred to the Committee on Health. Education, Labor, and Pensions, where it has remained 
without am..:ndmcnt or further action. 24 1 Sanmcl. supra note 1 89, at 445 ; see also Vecino, supra note 206, at 625; Eller v. Bolton, 
895 A.2d :182 ( Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (court amended QDRO after the death of the 
nonparticipant spouse on an ERISA-qualified pension). 
242 Sl'e. l'.g . . Samuel. supra note 1 89, at 449-50; Vecino, supra note 206, at 625; Phillips, 
l"llflra note 206, at 647-48. 
�4·; See. e.g. . Boggs, 520 U.S. at 861 (Breyer, J .. dissenting) . 
. -44 David Gregory, The Scope o( ER/SA Preemption of" State law: A Study in Effective r ,.,/aah.1 111. 4X U .  PITT. L .  REV. 427. 454 ( 1 987);  see also H .R. 2, 93d Cong., I st Sess. § 7 
( I  �7� l: l l R. RI I'. No. 93-533 ( 1 974 ). as reprinted in 1 974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655.  
- 4 �  Ciregory. supra note 244. at  443. 
24" Jay Conison. ER/SA and the language o( Preemption, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 6 1 9, 619-20 
( I  994 ). See also Phil l ips.  supra note 206. at 640. 
247 Phillips . . 111;wa 11ote 206. at 647. 
24� fd. at 648. 
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interpretation of ERISA's interaction with state community property 
law is not its arguably unfair deprivation of the nonparticipant spouse' s  
ownership interest in a pension earned during a community property 
regime. Rather, a more insidious and less obvious effect exists. The 
problem is caused by the fact that ERISA, at least as Boggs interpreted 
it, treats divorced nonparticipant spouses better than predeceasing 
nonparticipant spouses. This disparate treatment provides a substantial 
incentive to divorce. 
"After the Boggs decision, an estate planning lawyer must 
seriously consider whether he should advise a quickie no-fault divorce 
if a nonparticipant spouse is expected to die before the participant. At 
least one author has suggested, 'Failure to present this estate planning 
opportunity carries with it at least the theoretical possibility of an 
allegation of malpractice. "'249 A quickie divorce may be the only way 
for the nonparticipant spouse to gain testamentary control over her 
interest in the participant's pension and to assert an ownership interest 
in the asset she helped to produce during the existence of her 
community property regime with the p articipant spouse. 
The possibility that the nonparticipant spouse will act upon the 
incentive created by Boggs and ERISA is magnified when one considers 
the significance of pensions to the economic wellbeing of the average 
American couple.250 The effect of Boggs and ERISA is to divest 
nonparticipant spouses in community of "their rights in what is often the 
largest, single asset in the marital community."25 1 Financial instability 
has long been viewed as a serious and legitimate threat to the longevity 
of any marriage, and as a relevant factor in signaling the demise of a 
couple's life together. That the rules of marital property, not so much in 
their pure state form, but as overridden by federal policy, would add to 
that instability by creating an economic boon for a nonparticipant 
spouse with a hefty interest in her spouse's pension to divorce is rather 
surpnsmg. 
Still, neither Congress nor the majority in Boggs (or any other 
reported appel late decision) has expressed any recognition of the 
incentive created. Justice Breyer did articulate concern over the 
249 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 444 (quoting Boggs v. Boggs Holds that a Predeceasing 
Nonparticipant Spouse Has No Property Interest in an ER/SA Pension Plan, ERISA LITIG. RPTR. 
Rep. 4 (August 1 997)). 
250 See generally Employee Benefit Research Institute, The Retirement System in Transition: 
The 2007 Retirement Corifidence Survey, EBRI Issue Brief No. 304, p. 1 6  (April 2007), available 
at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_04a-20075.pdf ("Almost 3 in I 0 workers say they 
expect that most of their money in retirement will come from a work-place retirement savings 
plan, such as a 40 l (k) (28 percent)"). See also Phillips, supra note 206, at 648 ("While ERISA 
was not created as a wealth-transfer mechanism, the growth of private pensions in this country 
has effectively created a situation in which pension plans are the primary means of collecting 
wealth for families."). 
25 1 Phillips, supra note 206, at 648. 
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disturbing effect of the majority opinion in his Boggs dissent: "[I]t 
would be anomalous to find a congressional purpose in ERISA-despite 
the absence of express statutory language and any indication that 
Congress even considered the question-that would in effect deprive [a 
nonparticipant spouse] of her interest because, instead of divorcing [the 
participant spouse], she stayed with him till her last breath. "252 
It is certainly possible that the policies supporting a rule of 
preemption be explored and determined to take precedence over the 
merely theoretical-and, some may even argue, remote-possibility 
that a rule of preemption encourages divorce in a narrow factual 
setting.253 The policies that the Boggs court found Congress sought to 
foster through ERISA may simply be viewed as more important and 
more real then any theoretical concern over driving spouses toward 
divorce. That weighing of interests, however, has not been conducted 
by any court. The incentive to divorce needs to be either corrected, or 
given express recognition in the context of a decision to favor the rule 
of preemption over a rule that provides far fewer incentives to divorce. 
As long as neither happens and Boggs continues to percolate,254 the 
largely unremedied and unrecognized encouragement to divorce looms. 
I V .  T H E  N EED FOR A REEVALUATION O F  MARITAL PROPERTY RULES 
THAT ENCOURAGE DIVORCE 
The rules described here provide clear incentives for spouses in a 
community property regime to terminate their marriage, perhaps not 
because they desire that course of action, but because it is the only 
course of action that will provide them legitimate relief from some of 
the harsh effects of the rules of marital property. That the government 
prov ides these incentives to divorce is disturbing, in light of the 
evidence surrounding the benefits of marriage. Economists have long 
recognized the economies of scale inherent in joint consumption to be a 
signi ficant financial benefit of marriage.255 Moreover, the 
encouragement marriage gives to the achievement of gains caused by 
the spec ial ization of each spouse improves both the spouses' and 
soc iety' s  financial picture.2sr, In essence, "society has a stake in the 
2 5 :  Boggs. 520 U.S .  at 868 ( Breyer. J . •  dissenting); see also Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 444. 
2� -' It  11 ,11l ld he i l logical to change the rules of al l  pension plans to allow the nonparticipant 
s
_
pnusc tcstamcnta
.
r::' control in order to remove the divorce incentive. State statutory plans are 
l ike I\ tn ha1 c d i !  lcrcnt purposes than those provided by private employers, for i nstance, and 
special Cllilccrns may mil i tate against nonparticipant testamentary control here. 
2'4  Samu�!. 111/1/"ll note 1 89. at -1-B. 
2« ( i !WSSll .\RD-S l l l :C l lTl'vl.-\N. supra note 1 8. at 5 .  
2 '1• Dai i d  Lam . . \farriage Markets and Assortatil·e Mating with Household Puhlic Goods, 3 3  J .  
0 1  l l \\ 1 .  R F S< l l " RlTS -162. -18 1 ( 1 988) :  Shemrnn. supra note 1 7. a t  372. 
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stability of marriage," owing to the reduced societal burden brought by 
"the financial security, emotional support, and mutual care that marriage 
partners provide to one another over time."257 It is a stake that should 
be protected. 
A. Channeling Parties into Entering and Remaining in the Marital 
Relationship 
The rules  of family law, and especially the marital property rules, 
should be encouraging and incentivizing marriage, not divorce.258 
These rules can serve a channeling function, pushing spouses into an 
institution like marriage, which serves such a strong social purpose, and 
providing encouragement to remain there .259 Those channeling 
techniques might take many forms. The rules of marital property, for 
instance, might provide advantages to married individuals that other 
parties do not have. The rules might disfavor the use of competing 
institutions. They might penalize parties who choose divorce.260 
Those who question the propriety of the state endeavoring to guide 
behavior through substantive laws often argue that the state should 
remain as "hands off' as possible with regard to marital property.261 
For those who subscribe to this view, the rules of marital property 
should facilitate spousal desires and do nothing more.262 This theory 
has been somewhat well-received in the family law sphere in general. 
The past twenty years has seen a trend referred to as the 
"dejuridification of marriage," marked by the repeal of many norm­
setting laws surrounding marriage and family life.263 It is not possible 
in this context, however, for the state to act in a hands off manner. 
There must be rules governing the seizure of marital property by third 
party creditors upon divorce. 264 Testamentary transfers of the 
nonparticipant spouse's interest in the other' s pension plan either are or 
257 Scott, supra note 2, at 1 958. 
258 Examples of channeling rules in the family law sphere abound. See, e.g., Brotherson & 
Teichert, supra note 7, at 4 1  (describing the messages sent by rules of covenant marriage, same 
sex marriage, no fault divorce, and paternity testing, among others). 
259 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 
505 ( l 992). 
260 Ic/. at 503 . For a discussion of a number of ways in which states have encouraged 
marriage, see Brian H. Bix, State Interest and Marriage-The Theoretical Perspective, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 1 00-02 (2003). 
26 1 See generally Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of Marital Property be Normative?, 2004 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 2 6 5  (2004). 
262 Id. 
263 MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW, 64 ( 1 987). 
264 Id. at 1 39 (family law cannot be "neutral . . . for refusing to take a moral position is a moral 
stand in itself'). See also Frantz, supra note 26 1 ,  at 289 (particularly with regard to "property 
division and support upon divorce," one rule or another must be set). 
1968 CA RDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 30:5 
are not permissible. The state must either leave spo�ses to f�nd for 
themselves upon mismanagement of a spouse, or provide a unilateral, 
albeit court-supervised, means of retaining the marital relationship but 
terminating the community property regime. Dejuridification is simply 
not an option here. Lawmakers must necessarily develop rules that 
either incentivize divorce, or encourage spouses to remain married.265 
A number of community property j urisdictions have acted in a 
similar context, not to disincentivize divorce, but rather to remove an 
incentive to parties to marry for the wrong reasons.266 Creditor­
avoidance-based incentives to marry were found obj ectionable rather 
early on, and community states changed their rules of debt collection in 
the marital context for the purpose of removing the incentives. 
Precisely the same thing should happen where the debt collection rule 
regarding the property available for seizure after termination of the 
community property regime incentivizes divorce. 
In the context of the three marital property rules described herein, 
it is clear how each might be modified to remove inappropriate divorce 
incentives. First, the debt collection rules of California and Idaho 
should be modified to eliminate the boon a spouse in community 
receives upon divorce. After termination of the marriage, a nondebtor 
spouse's former community property should be seizable for debts the 
other incurred during the marriage, j ust as they are if that same creditor 
seeks to collect during the marital relationship. Second, all community 
jurisdictions should develop a method whereby a spouse can 
unilaterally, and even over the objection of the other, seek termination 
of the community property regime while remaining married. To force a 
spouse into divorce solely to obtain relief for the other spouse's 
continuing mismanagement is misguided. Third, either the text of 
ERISA or the interpretation afforded it by the Supreme Court needs to 
be modified to give a nonparticipant spouse, at least in narrowly­
tailored circumstances, the possibility of disposing of her interest by 
testament. Treating nonparticipant spouses at death worse than their 
divorcing counterparts creates an inconsistency that should drive 
thinking persons toward divorce. 
Changing each of these rules might solve particular inequities. Of 
course, the changes might create inequities as well.267 Holding the 
265 See GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, supra note 18, at 75. 266 See supra text accompanying notes 112- 1 17 describing the "marital bankruptcy " 267 I · ·n1 · 
' 
· 
t ts certa1 Y possible that the changes in the marital property rules suggested herein might cause more spou
.
se
·
s
· 
to enter into matrii:ionial agreements for the purpose of avoiding the new rules. That pos�1b1hty does not undermme the call for change. First, while the rules of marital prope� are typically suppletive rules that the parties can contract around, there are some things that sunply may not legally be done by matrimonial agreement. Not all community property �tates allow the spouses to set a debt collection rule that must be respected by their creditors for mstance. Carroll, supra note 29, at 26-37 (describing varying rules in community property s;ates 
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entirety of the community property once owned by spouses for the debt 
of just one even after the marriage has terminated, for instance, is not 
without philosophical problem. Nonetheless, the changes would "send 
a social message about the nature of marriage itself that would become 
incorporated into the meaning of the institution, thus shaping the 
behavior of present and future couples."268 The message would be a 
communal one. 269 It is the message that is the very core of the 
community property regime: spouses are in it together, sharing and 
contributing to a marital partnership . 
The effect of changes such as those suggested here to marital 
property law would "be immediate on those already married. As for 
new entrants in the marriage market, they will be able to adjust in 
advance to the change in law and will react differently after the change 
in law relative to how they would have reacted if the law had not 
changed."270 The law would be acting as Aristotle envisioned it-a 
persuasive tool for shaping human conduct.211  
Not everyone agrees that law should embrace a normative, 
behavior-shaping function.272 Accepting this channeling function 
depends, in part, upon a view of marriage as not merely a private 
institution, but rather a state one.273 It is perhaps easier to accept the 
on whether to enforce matrimonial agreements against creditors). Moreover, the spouses could 
not by agreement force an ERISA-qualified plan administrator to pay benefits to a nonparticipant 
spouse's legatees. Second, the reality is that very few people actually contract out of the legal 
regime of community property. The most recent estimates put that segment of the population at 
roughly five percent. Frantz, supra note 26 1 ,  at 274; see also Sherman, supra note 1 7  at 372 
( 1 990s statistics). But see American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Survey of Nation 's Top 
Divorce Lawyers Reveals a Surge in Prenuptial Agreements (2006), available at 
http://www.aaml.org/files/public/Prenuptial_Surge_IO- l 0-2006.htm ("An overwhelming 80% of 
divorce attorneys cited an increase in prenuptial agreements during the past five years in a recent 
poll of American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyer (AAML) members ."). However, as long as 
negative social views surround the execution of matrimonial agreements, these numbers are not 
likely to increase substantially. Third, the default rule is important for psychological reasons, 
regardless of how many couples opt out of it. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, 
Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral Economics 11{ Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & 
INEQ. 1 09, 132 (2008). Marital property mies are "essential for facilitating trust and shaping 
expectation," even if they can be contracted around. Carolyn Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, On 
Marital Property, N.Y.U. Law Sch, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Res. 
Paper no. 45, at 3 8  (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=325062. The manner in which 
the state sets the default rules is significant. Frantz, supra note 26 1 ,  at 273.  Here, the state has 
done it in a way that favors everyone but the spouses. 
268 Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 ,  at 275. 
269 fd. 
270 Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Property Division at Divorce an Demographic Behavior: 
An Economic Analysis and International Comparison, American Economics Association (2002), 
at 3-4. Small numbers of couples may contract out of the community property regime entirely. 
For a discussion of that possibility, see text accompanying supra note 267. 
271 Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 24. 
272 See, e.g. , MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 36 (1 993) 
(describing a shift away from norm-influencing family law rules since the Victorian era). 
273 Frantz, supra note 2 6 1 ,  at 291 -92. 
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channeling function of law in the community property context, 
however, which is already heavily norm-laden, than it is in other areas. 
The community regime, in each of the American states which has 
adopted it, is a regime with the purpose of projecting a certain image of 
marriage.274 The regime is lauded for its gains in treating spouses 
equally, for recognizing the value of all forms of contribution to the 
running of a household (monetary and otherwise), and for treating the 
spouses as partners working toward a common goal and sharing equally 
in the risks and rewards of their future.275 The marital property of the 
other forty-one states cannot be said to have as substantial of a 
normative background. 
From these base notions of community, it is really only a small 
step in the direction of normativity to modify three marital property 
rules to remove the incentives to divorce that they carry. The change 
would merely serve to further emphasize to existing and future spouses 
in community that they are partners. Creditors with whom one spouse 
creates relationships during the existence of the community property 
regime should not be eluded by divorce. Acts of mismanagement by 
one spouse should allow the other a method of protecting himself by 
escaping the community property regime, but should not force him to 
resort to divorce. And the interest a spouse in community earns in the 
other' s  pension should not be relinquished merely because 
nonparticipant testamentary transfers are not recognized. The aims of 
the already quite normative community property regime would be 
furthered with these changes, and spouses would be channeled into 
maintaining the marital relationship that so benefits both the two of 
them and society in general. 
B. The Limits of Marital Property Law to Shape Human Conduct 
This is, perhaps, an overly optimistic goal. The degree to which 
changing the rules of marital property, or any other rules in the family 
law arena, for that matter, can have an actual, real-world impact on 
spouses is somewhat questionable. After all, even if marital property 
rules provide spouses with incentives to divorce, there is  n o  evidence 
that spouses act on those incentives with any regularity.276 The most 
274 Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 1 9  
BAYLOR L .  REV. 20, 2 7  ( 1 967) ("A rational process o f  thought culminated i n  the decision that the 
wife shoul� ha
.
ve equal 
.
property rights in marital property acquisitions. Community of property 
1s the appltcatJ.on of this thought, and the phrase itself is merely a shorthand rendition of the 
whole concept that the husband and wife are equals."). 
275 Samuel, supra note 189, at 428-29. 
276 See Douglas W. Allen, The Impact of Legal Regimes on Marriage and Divorce, in THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1 9 1  (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthom 
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substantial limit of the channeling function is that its success cannot be 
measured.277 "No one can chart with confidence the ways in which law, 
customs, new lines of behavior, ideas about law, and ideas about 
morality reciprocally influence each other."278 The decision to divorce 
a spouse is not a simple economic decision. There are a number of 
interconnected factors that must be considered, including the rearing of 
children, living arrangements, expenses, and a whole host of emotional 
factors.279 Some of these factors are considered carefully and rationally, 
and some are not.280 And if divorce decisions are not rationally made, 
then the state can't meet any channeling or norm-shaping aims with the 
modification of legal rules. "[M]arital property law is [just] too remote 
from people' s  actual marriages to make any difference."281  
Still, devotees of the law and economics movement have long 
considered the decision to divorce, like that to marry in the first place, 
as a utility calculus that each individual makes.282 Parties considering 
exiting a marriage weigh, if subconsciously, all of the barriers to exit, 
including the financial, moral, and social cost of divorce, against the 
benefits of remaining in the marital relationship. Of course, even 
economists recognize that some decisions to divorce will be made 
impulsively and immaturely, by parties without any real knowledge of 
the legal ramifications either of remaining married or of divorcing.28 3 
But law and economics has morphed our view of the divorce decision 
into one that is "essentially a consumer decision, one that involves a 
comparison of the costs and benefits of marriage versus single life."284 
It is possible, with such a view of divorce, to shape behavior and to 
eds . .  Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002) (describing the difficulty of measuring the empirical effect of 
law on the divorce decision). A number of studies in the last twenty years have sought to assess 
the impact of the movement towards no-fault divorce on actual divorce rates. See id.; Ian Smith, 
European Divorce Laws. Divorce Rates, and Their Consequences, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 212  at Table 1 2. I (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthom eds. 2002) 
(European study of impact of no-fault divorce on divorce rates). 
277 Schneider, supra note 259, at 5 1 2- 1 3 .  
278 GLENDON, supra note 263, at 1 3 8 .  
2 79 GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, supra note 1 8, at  9 5 ;  see also Scott, supra note 17, at 42 
("Withdrawal, boredom, pursuit of other relationships, immersion in career, and conflict over 
finances, children, and other family may all weaken the resolve to sustain a lasting relationship 
and may ultimately lead to the marital breakdown."); Slibaugh, supra note 20 (criticizing the 
American Law Institute's Principles on the Law of Family Dissolution for their failure to 
recognize that even financial decisions suffer from an emotional taint when a marriage dissolves). 
Parties may remain in unsatisfying marriages for any number of reasons that have absolutely 
nothing to do with financial considerations. Id. at 242-43. 
280 See Frantz, supra note 261 ,  at 272 (spouses do not freely choose between staying married 
or divorced "based on the desirability" of the rules governing each status).  
28 1  Id. at 285; see also Weisbrod, supra note 3 ,  at 1 005 ("[L]aw [is] not a prime determinant of 
behavior in relation to marital stability."). 
282 See, e.g. , GROSSBARD-SHECHTMAN, supra note 1 7, at 44 (on the decision to enter into the 
marital relationship). 
283 Scott, supra note I 7, at 56. 
284 Wilkinson-Ryan & Small, supra note 267, at 1 12 .  
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promote the institution of marriage, in some small way at least, merely 
by modifying marital property rules that send inappropriate messages 
about marriage. 
But the problem with the notion that bettering rules of marital 
property will send a message that encourages spouses to remain married 
is exacerbated by the fact that any rule which seeks to change behavior 
is dependent upon the relevant parties' actual knowledge of the 
governing rule. For marital property law to succeed in a normative 
capacity, "it must communicate well."285 There is certainly sociological 
evidence which suggests that the rules of marital property fail to meet 
this challenge. Spouses do not know a great deal about the details of 
divorce law.286 Thanks to popular culture, however, they know more 
about laws relating to divorce than almost any other area of law.287 And 
there is good reason to believe that spouses will become aware of many 
marital property rules before a decision to divorce is made. If the 
marital property rules herein explored are at issue, that necessarily 
means that the spouses either have some substantial debt of which 
creditors are seeking satisfaction, one spouse is mismanaging the 
marital assets rather seriously, or a nonparticipant spouse is concerned 
with protecting her interest in the other' s  retirement benefits. In all of 
these scenarios, parties are likely to consult with a lawyer before taking 
any serious action. It is not reasonable, then, to assume that the marital 
property rules detailed here cannot cause divorce because spouses lack 
knowledge of the rules. Spouses are likely to hear of the applicable 
rules from their estate planning lawyers, those professionals aiding them 
in defending a debt collection, or others. It is likely, then, that the law 
communicates well enough in this area to steer parties in one direction 
or another. The question merely becomes one of how marital property 
rules wil l steer them-toward remaining married or toward terminating 
their relationship? 
C. The Utility of a Marriage-lncentivizing Expressive Rule 
Even if spouses lack knowledge of the marital property rules that 
govern them and fail to act rationally in making divorce decisions, such 
that no legitimate argument may be made that the state shapes conduct 
�
8� Cass R. Sunstein. 011 the Expressii•e Function <if Law, U. PA. L. REV. 202 1 ,  2050 ( 1 996). �86 . Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions 
a11cl
_ 
l:.xpectalio11.1· of Divorce at the Time vf Marriage, 1 7  LAW & HUM. BEHA v. 439, 44 1 ( 1 993). 
In tact. at least one study suggests that spouses know less about marital property than they do 
about most other aspects of divorce. including child custody and child and spousal support. Id. 
The more ··m111utc and technical'" the details of the marital property rule are, the less likely the 
rules are to shape human behavior. Frantz, supra note 26 1 ,  at 276. 
:'�7 Baker & Emery. supra note 286. at 442. 
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through marital property law, there may be good reason for setting aside 
rules of marital property which incentivize divorce. In addition to 
channeling parties into social institutions which have desirable 
outcomes, law can serve an expressive purpose.288 This view of the role 
of marital property law is not dependent on its ability to modify 
behavior. The expressive function of law might be appropriately 
exercised even absent any change in conduct resulting from the 
expression.289 In this sense, the "law perfonns a pedagogical role"290 
and even if its students are unresponsive, there may be value in the 
message. The rules of marital property can encourage responsible 
behavior.29 1 They can contribute to social dialogue,292 which, in this 
case is likely to center around the respective contributions and roles of 
the spouses in marriage. The message communicated by marital 
property law, particularly in a community property regime, should be 
one that emphasizes and encourages sharing and working together as 
partners in a relationship that has beneficial societal effects.293 
And even if all of this encouragement and dialogue results in no 
change in attitudes about divorce, there is value in such an expression 
itself, grounded in an individual interest in integrity.294 The state' s  
integrity i s  grounded in supporting and promoting the institution most 
beneficial for its citizens. In the marriage context, that is most certainly 
not divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
With the advent of no-fault divorce, barriers to exit that once 
288 Schneider, supra note 259, at 498 (describing expressive function of law as imparting 
ideas). Many are critical of state expressionism, though expressive theories of law have been 
afforded "renewed salience" in the literature in recent years. See, e.g. , Matthew D. Adler, 
Expressive Theories o.llaw: A Skeptical Overview, 1 48 U. PA. L. REV. 1 363, 1 369 (calling for a 
more general argument against expressivism); Scott, supra note 2, at 1 929 (lauding expressive 
theory as particularly relevant in the family law context, despite its criticisms, because of the 
great number of rules that are not formally enforced). 
289 See genera/(y Sunstein, supra note 285, at 2024-25 (defining the "expressive function of 
law" as "the function of law in 'making statements"' even absent behavioral control). 
290 GLENDON, supra note 263, at 1 39; Weisbrod, supra note 3, at 994. 
2 9 1  Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 7, at 34 .  
292 Id. at 24. 
293 Samuel & Spaht, supra note 1 89, at 428-29; see also Frantz, supra note 261 ,  at 284 
(regardless of parties' satisfaction with the changes, the state might justifiably modify the mies of 
marital property to make marriages "morally better"). One scholar has described modem family 
law as militating quite in the opposite direction, "reinforc[ing] a pessimistic account of 
contemporary marriage as a relationship involving minimum commitment and maximum self­
gratification." S cott, supra note 1 7, at 22. 
294 Sunstein, supra note 285, at 2026-27. 
1 974 CA R D OZO LA W R E VIE W (Vol.  30:5 
existed in the marital relationship have been all but eliminated.295 Both 
entry into and exit from marriage are now legally free.296 Not many 
people seriously argue today that no-fault divorce should be 
abolished.297 On the contrary, easy exit from the marital bond has come 
to be viewed as an individual freedom that should not be abrogated. 298 
As Jong as society has an interest in promoting marriage, however, steps 
can and should be taken to address the risks opened by free exit. 299 
Marital property rules can play a central role in addressing those 
risks.3oo But they cannot serve the institution of marriage if they 
encourage and incentivize divorce. 
Of course, not every marriage should be saved. In exercising both 
its channeling and expressive functions, family law must be cognizant 
of the fact that some spousal relationships are simply "outside the 
communal idea of marriage"30J and unworthy of protection.302 
Lawmakers must be careful not to commit "the error of the doctor who, 
to preserve the health of his healthy patients, places them on a regime 
for the ilJ . "303 Before the three marital property rules herein discussed 
are changed to remove the perverse divorce incentives they bring, for 
instance, the effect on functional families, and not just those on the 
verge of divorce, must be considered. 304 The rules of marital property 
and divorce are so closely associated that any evaluation or 
modification of one set of rules without consideration of the other 
brings a strong likel ihood of spousal suffering, either in marriage or 
divorce.Jos Thus far, neither lawmakers, judges, nor scholars have 
undertaken that study. And the result is a mass of marital property law 
which undermines the very fabric of the matrimonial regime it is 
designed to support. 
.:''):\ Karen Turnage Boyd, The Tale o( Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce laws Can 
Remedr tlw U11i11 te11cled Effects of Pure No-Fault Divorce, 12  CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 609, 6 1 2  
( 2006) ( noting that all  states had some fonn of no-fault divorce by I 985) . 
.:'% Frantz & Dagan. supra note 267. at 1 5. 
297 !Jut .1ee Pau l T. Davis, The 2002 Legislative Session. A Midterm Report, 7 1  J .  KAN. BAR 
Ass'N ( April 2002 ) ( describing a failed move in the Kansas Senate to abolish no-fault d ivorce for 
couples with children) .  
2 9 X  Frantz & Dagan. supra note 26 7,  at 15 .  
2')') Id at  20-2 1 .  In  the business context. for example, arrangements are open-ended, but  the 
law encourages parties to commit to these relationships by "assuring their investments are 
protected if the other breaches." REGAN. supra note 272, at 1 39. The same strategy should be 
employed in the marital relationship . 
.1 IHl Frantz & Dagan. supra note 267, at 20-2 1 . 
.1 0 I  Frantz & Dagan. supra note 267. at 1 8. 
102 8111 see Shcnnan. supra note 1 7, at 394 (arguing that even a bad marital bargain may be 
better than none).  
_;o_; Hte. supra note 1 24. at 54 1 .  Some believe it is  folly to object to a legal rule simply 
because Its c:x1stence may cause people to alter their behavior in calculating ways. See S hennan, 
supm note 1 7. at 396. 
31l.J See Brotherson & Teichert. supra note 7. at 26 . 
.10' Simon Clark. loll'. Propertl'. and Marital Dissolution. I 09 ECON. J. C4 I ,  C53 ( 1 999). 
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The limit of law is important to recognize in this context.306 No 
matter how marital property rules  are modified, they cannot be 
structured to protect spouses "from the collapse of the emotional core of 
their relationship."307 But marital property rules can operate in the 
background, providing a "safety net that minimizes certain incentives 
for opportunism" and encourages continuity in marriage. 3os 
A critical reevaluation of the rules of marital property is needed, 
with a particular emphasis placed on whether some of those rules are 
justified. At least with regard to post-dissolution creditor access to 
former community property, the unilateral ability of a spouse to remain 
married but bring the community property regime to an end for the 
other' s  mismanagement, and the possibility of the nonparticipant spouse 
making testamentary transfers of her interest in an BRISA-governed 
pension, the results of that reevaluation are likely to call for a change. 
These rules do not succeed in "promoting their accepted values."309 
Indeed, each of them seems to undermine the ideals of the community 
property regime. And worse yet, they push spouses, unnecessarily, 
toward divorce, an indirect attack on marriage3 10 with which we should 
all be concerned. 
306 "[T]here is something in family law that [is] peculiarly difficult. The problem is centrally 
that we care so much, and that law, finally, can do so little." Weisbrod, supra note 3, at 1007. 
307 Frantz & Dagan, supra note 267, at 38.  
308 Id. at 40. 
309 Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 9 1 CAL L. REv. 1 5 1 7, 1 561 (2003). 
3 1 0 Samuel, supra note 1 89, at 442-443 (describing indirect attack on marriage as one "made 
through the enactment of laws that redefine or undermine marriage or deny recognition to its 
inherent nature"). 
